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Forecasting and Manipulating the Forecasts of Others
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(91)90012-popenalex-snapshot
Equilibrium with signal extraction from endogenous variables
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3932(03)00029-1openalex-snapshot
Implications of rational inattention
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/5.3.387openalex-snapshot
Insider Trading in Continuous Time
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/tac.2013.2239000openalex-snapshot
Decentralized Stochastic Control with Partial History Sharing: A Common Information Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00486.xopenalex-snapshot
A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00783.xopenalex-snapshot
Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb04075.xopenalex-snapshot
Strategic Trading When Agents Forecast the Forecasts of Others
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282802762024610openalex-snapshot
Social Value of Public Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.3.769openalex-snapshot
Optimal Sticky Prices under Rational Inattention
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20181489openalex-snapshot
Information Design: A Unified Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159openalex-snapshot
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913210openalex-snapshot
Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te1808openalex-snapshot
Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4310/cis.2006.v6.n3.a5openalex-snapshot
Large population stochastic dynamic games: closed-loop McKean-Vlasov systems and the Nash certainty equivalence principle
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