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Tie-breaking, election promises, and actual policy in two-election spatial competition

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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00124924openalex-snapshot
Incumbent performance and electoral control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00435496openalex-snapshot
Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01718440openalex-snapshot
The control of politicians: An economic model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90011-4openalex-snapshot
A dynamical model of political equilibrium
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.11.006openalex-snapshot
Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.004openalex-snapshot
Randomized experiments from non-random selection in U.S. House elections
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.014openalex-snapshot
Two-party competition with persistent policies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381608081024openalex-snapshot
Electoral Selection, Strategic Challenger Entry, and the Incumbency Advantage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/256633openalex-snapshot
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdt014openalex-snapshot
Candidates, Credibility, and Re-election Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555136openalex-snapshot
An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2007.5.4.846openalex-snapshot
Political Reputations and Campaign Promises
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20150927openalex-snapshot
The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: Accountability, Commitment, and Responsiveness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00016057openalex-snapshot
Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/136033openalex-snapshot
Spatial Models of Political Competition under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions They Take
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1956016openalex-snapshot
Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2111212openalex-snapshot
Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2224214openalex-snapshot
Stability in Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2938353openalex-snapshot
Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2946658openalex-snapshot
A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
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