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Learning-Optimal Design of Data Markets
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90052-9openalex-snapshot
A monopolistic market for information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/701813openalex-snapshot
The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdr004openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Learning in Social Networks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00317openalex-snapshot
Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00442.xopenalex-snapshot
Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015439openalex-snapshot
Markets for Information: An Introduction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177729032openalex-snapshot
Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20161079openalex-snapshot
The Design and Price of Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20191330openalex-snapshot
Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20181489openalex-snapshot
Information Design: A Unified Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2938355openalex-snapshot
Direct and Indirect Sale of Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003640openalex-snapshot
Collusion and the Incentives for Information Sharing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta13958openalex-snapshot
First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te1808openalex-snapshot
Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
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