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https://doi.org/10.2307/1960863

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-68820-1_15openalex-snapshot
On the Economics of Organization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00133748openalex-snapshot
Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf03187594openalex-snapshot
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(76)90040-5openalex-snapshot
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0261-3794(83)90067-7openalex-snapshot
Money in congressional elections
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/260997openalex-snapshot
The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198774358.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1886017openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1956842openalex-snapshot
An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1957085openalex-snapshot
Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2110770openalex-snapshot
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2110787openalex-snapshot
Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2110891openalex-snapshot
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2110997openalex-snapshot
The New Economics of Organization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2111089openalex-snapshot
Sophisticated and Myopic Behavior in Legislative Committees: An Experimental Study

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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The Argument: Three Procedural Steps
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Congressional allocation of federal funds: The Job Training Partnership Act of 1982
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Formal Models of Bureaucracy
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What Do We Do With Applied Research?
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Recognition probability in legislative bargaining
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Agenda Control in the 2008 CNN/YouTube Debates
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Agenda, power and text: the formulation of policy in school councils
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Booster seats: new committee chairs and legislative effectiveness
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The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation
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Bureaucratic Performance and Control in British Politics: Asylum Policy 1994–2007
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Regulatory Choices: Analyzing State Policy Design
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Formal Theory and the Institutions of Governance
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Setting a Judicial Agenda: The Decision to Grant En Banc Review in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
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PROBLEM DEFINITION AND THE ALASKA NATIVES: ETHNIC IDENTITY AND POLICY FORMATION
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901.085659openalex-snapshot
H ERBERT A. S IMON : Political Scientist
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/095169280201400106openalex-snapshot
Heresthetical Maneuvering on the US Supreme Court
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/0951692891003001004openalex-snapshot
Stabilization and Cutbacks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/14789299231203657openalex-snapshot
Social Choice and Citizen Participation: Bringing Democratic Theory to Public Administration
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1036openalex-snapshot
The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/1958066openalex-snapshot
Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/2082511openalex-snapshot
A Model of Muddling Through
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/419452openalex-snapshot
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Promises are Promises? A Study of Campaign Promise Fulfillment among South Korean Legislators, 2008–2012
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The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation
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