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Escalation and the Nuclear Option.
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4166419openalex-extracted
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The Early Discussion of Nuclear Weapons Technology in the 1930s and 1940s—Illustrating the Theoretical Construct
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Military strategy in the 21st century
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Weak party escalation: An underestimated strategy for small states?
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2020.1770968openalex-snapshot
Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Warfare: A Perfect Storm of Instability?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/05679326808457170openalex-snapshot
Change and security in Europe part I: The background
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The reappraisal of limited war
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Some possible surprises in our nuclear future
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Promoting Human Rights and Preventing Nuclear Proliferation: Some Comparisons
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Strategy: A vital determinant for army force structure planning
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2020.1857911openalex-snapshot
Deterrence in the age of artificial intelligence & autonomy: a paradigm shift in nuclear deterrence theory and practice?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyz007openalex-snapshot
Escalation Firebreaks in the Cyber, Conventional, and Nuclear Domains: Moving Beyond Effects-Based Logics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1162/016228802760987824openalex-snapshot
Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1162/016228805775124570openalex-snapshot
India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1162/isec.23.1.78openalex-snapshot
NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00359openalex-snapshot
Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/000271627039000111openalex-snapshot
International Relations, 1965-1969
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/002188638702300403openalex-snapshot
Performing the Nuclear Ceremony: The Arms Race as a Ritual
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Factors Affecting Entry into Psychological Traps
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Organising the unthinkable in times of crises: Will climate engineering become the weapon of last resort in the Anthropocene?
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Deterring and Responding to Asymmetrical Threats
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Cooperative measures to support the Indo-Pak Agreement Reducing Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons.
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A Primer on U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy
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Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departure from Containment
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The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World
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Rethinking the unthinkable – revisiting theories of nuclear deterrence and escalation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.2395openalex-snapshot
Disarming Rogues: Deterring First-Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction
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