On the public citation graph
https://doi.org/10.2307/20111873
0 signed · 28 inferred · view as graph
Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.
Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the
claims that are yours.
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a
known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped
badge you can embed.
What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0164-0704(84)90011-9openalex-snapshot
Fundamental methods of mathematical economics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1018324020637openalex-snapshot
The Effect of Number and Size of Interest Groups on Social Rent Dissipation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1991.tb01250.xopenalex-snapshot
COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS, CONSTITUENT PREFERENCES, AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691213200openalex-snapshot
Game Theory for Political Scientists
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1059776openalex-snapshot
What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and Votes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1957085openalex-snapshot
Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2109998openalex-snapshot
Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions Matter?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2527407openalex-snapshot
Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2554291openalex-snapshot
Game Theory with Applications to Economics.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2586303openalex-snapshot
Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003462openalex-snapshot
The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-019-09278-2openalex-snapshot
Bootleggers, Baptists, and the risks of rent seeking
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9482-3openalex-snapshot
Varying the intensity of competition in a multiple prize rent seeking experiment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9537-5openalex-snapshot
Who will deregulate the deregulators?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.018openalex-snapshot
A partially exclusive rent-seeking contest
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2020.101543openalex-snapshot
A Rent Seeking Experiment with Leakage from the Contest Success Function
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1155/2020/8081370openalex-snapshot
The Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games with Policymaker Cost and Competition Intensity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907307290openalex-snapshot
Allocating Lobbying Resources between Collective and Private Rents
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2012-0031openalex-snapshot
The Problem with the Holdout Problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.31390/gradschool_theses.2823openalex-snapshot
The impact of structural adjustment loans on civil conflict
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3390/math11214524openalex-snapshot
Complex Dynamic Analysis for a Rent-Seeking Game with Political Competition and Policymaker Costs
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity
Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers
publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free
and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.