On the public citation graph
The Choice of `Conservative' Bankers in Open Economies: Monetary Regime Options for Europe
0 signed · 24 inferred · view as graph
Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.
Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the
claims that are yours.
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a
known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped
badge you can embed.
What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(89)90079-2openalex-snapshot
Conservative central bankers in a two-country world
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(94)90037-xopenalex-snapshot
Delegation in international monetary policy games∗
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1885679openalex-snapshot
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.307424openalex-extracted
International Coordination of Macroeconomic Policies: Still Alive in the New Millennium?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.371680openalex-extracted
Independent Utility Regulators: Lessons from Monetary Policy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-01961-5_6openalex-snapshot
EMU: Benefits, Costs and Real Convergence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-01961-5_7openalex-snapshot
Monetary Policy in the EMU: Theoretical Issues and Assessment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf02707901openalex-snapshot
Fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union: Credible inflation targets or monetized debt?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00086-5openalex-snapshot
Optimal monetary policy cooperation through state-independent contracts with targets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3932(98)00032-4openalex-snapshot
Can political monetary cycles be avoided?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511493362.002openalex-snapshot
The IMF and international financial architecture: solvency and liquidity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511493362.004openalex-snapshot
International coordination of macroeconomic policies: still alive in the new millennium?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1008220801959openalex-snapshot
Two-Country Models of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1013973214733openalex-snapshot
Delegation and Fiscal Policy in the Open Economy: More Bad News for Rogoff's Delegation Game
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1019912113833openalex-snapshot
Seigniorage, Delegation and Common Currency: Why Monetary Unions May Fail?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0335.00090openalex-snapshot
The Nature of Shocks in Europe and in Germany
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1353/mcb.2003.0041openalex-snapshot
Accountability, Transparency, and Inflation Targeting
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.17016/ifdp.2002.723openalex-snapshot
International Coordination of Macroeconomic Policies: Still Alive in the New Millennium?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.22456/2176-5456.10670openalex-snapshot
A MENSURAÇÃO DO GRAU DE INDEPENDENCIA DO BANCO CENTRAL: UMA ANÁLISE DE SUAS FRAGILIDADES
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.29358/sceco.v0i16-17.70openalex-snapshot
EMU – “Optimum” or “Viable” Currency Area?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3406/reco.2001.410300openalex-snapshot
Externalités budgétaires et choix du banquier central dans une union monétaire. La délégation comme solution coopérative de second rang
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3917/ecoi.093.0037openalex-snapshot
L'entrée des PECO dans la zone euro: quels effets sur le bien-être ?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3917/reco.521.0035openalex-snapshot
Externalités budgétaires et choix du banquier central dans une union monétaire
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5089/9781451856118.001openalex-snapshot
Selected Issues Concerning Monetary Policy and Institutional Design for Central Banks
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity
Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers
publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free
and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.