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State-Contingent Inflation Contracts and Unemployment Persistence

https://doi.org/10.2307/2953694
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UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF EXCHANGE RATE PEGS
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A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
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