On the public citation graph

Machines and the Mental

https://doi.org/10.2307/3131645
0 signed · 58 inferred · view as graph

Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the claims that are yours.
Claim with ORCID
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped badge you can embed.
See reference health

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_21openalex-snapshot
Naturalism and Evolutionary Epistemologies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1452-1_20openalex-snapshot
Artificial Consciousness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-26782-5_3openalex-snapshot
Artificial Feudalism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2161-0_12openalex-snapshot
Husserl and the Representational Theory of Mind
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2342-3_5openalex-snapshot
Some Aspects of Empiricism and Empirical Knowledge
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2699-8_4openalex-snapshot
Syntactic Semantics: Foundations of Computational Natural-Language Understanding
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00139224openalex-snapshot
Husserl and the representational theory of mind
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00166502openalex-snapshot
Awareness, understanding, and functionalism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00413555openalex-snapshot
Artificial intelligence and personal identity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00873258openalex-snapshot
Semantics and the computational paradigm in cognitive psychology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00974301openalex-snapshot
Why isn't my pocket calculator a thinking thing?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00974302openalex-snapshot
Because mere calculating isn't thinking
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00974303openalex-snapshot
The sense of ?thinking?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00975533openalex-snapshot
Reaping the whirlwind: Reply to Harnad's ?other bodies, other minds?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf01044124openalex-snapshot
Logical pragmatism and dialectical materialism: The beginning of dialogue
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf01063895openalex-snapshot
The allure of connectionism reexamined
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf01128592openalex-snapshot
Asymmetry of access to intentional states
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf01801408openalex-snapshot
Bedeutungsverstehen als Kennzeichen des Mentalen
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-6268-5openalex-snapshot
Representation and the First-Person Perspective
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-215495-9.50010-7openalex-snapshot
Computationalism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-215495-9.50011-9openalex-snapshot
The Causal Powers of CPUs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-215495-9.50015-6openalex-snapshot
Syntactic Semantics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-51726-5.50019-4openalex-snapshot
INFORMATION IN COMPUTER SCIENCE
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2010.03.001openalex-snapshot
Why we still need a mark of the cognitive
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511730191.020openalex-snapshot
ARTIFICIAL LIFE AND SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511730191.021openalex-snapshot
Learning from functionalism: prospects for strong artificial life
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00030673openalex-snapshot
Comments on Dennett from a cautious ally
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00030685openalex-snapshot
Dennett's intentions and Darwin's legacy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00030697openalex-snapshot
Evolution, teleology, intentionality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1008255830248openalex-snapshot
Searle's Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/02691729008578566openalex-snapshot
Computationalism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/02691729008578567openalex-snapshot
Responses to ‘Computationalism‘
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/0270271880090403openalex-snapshot
IMAGES, WORDS, AND THOUGHTS
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019512815x.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019512815x.001.0001.002.003openalex-snapshot
Copyright Page
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019512815x.001.0001.002.005openalex-snapshot
Contributors
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019512815x.001.0001.002.006openalex-snapshot
Abbreviations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019512815x.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019512815x.003.0002openalex-snapshot
Spinoza's Substance Monism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019512815x.003.0003openalex-snapshot
Monism in Spinoza
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019512815x.003.0004openalex-snapshot
Causation in Spinoza
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019512815x.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Concrete Logic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019512815x.003.0006openalex-snapshot
What Counts as an Individual for Spinoza?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019512815x.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Mirroring Spinoza's Mind
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019512815x.003.0008openalex-snapshot
Spinoza's Conatus Argument
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019512815x.003.0009openalex-snapshot
Spinoza on the Relativity of Good and Evil
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019512815x.003.0010openalex-snapshot
Spinoza, Thoughtful Teleology, and the Causal Significance of Content
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019512815x.003.0011openalex-snapshot
The Middle Spinoza
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019512815x.003.0012openalex-snapshot
Leibniz, Spinoza, and Tschirnhaus
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1986.tb00327.xopenalex-snapshot
Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View*
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1992.tb00205.xopenalex-snapshot
Names, Contents, and Causes
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.1993.00123.xopenalex-snapshot
INTENTIONALITY IN RESEARCH ON TEACHING
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1989.tb00943.xopenalex-snapshot
Radical Interpretation and the Gunderson Game
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12458openalex-snapshot
Reinforcement learning and artificial agency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1142/s1793843009000062openalex-snapshot
MACHINE CONSCIOUSNESS: A MANIFESTO FOR ROBOTICS
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.24159/joec.2018.24.6.189openalex-snapshot
A View on Complementary Relation of Human teacher and AI teacher in Future Education
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3389/frai.2025.1509338openalex-snapshot
Making sense of transformer success
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5860/choice.35-6203openalex-snapshot
Brainchildren: essays on designing minds
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.