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Determinants of the Choice of the Hostile Takeover Mechanism: An Empirical Analysis of Tender Offers and Proxy Contests

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0164-0704(86)90027-3openalex-snapshot
The theory and practice of econometrics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(86)90008-xopenalex-snapshot
Predicting takeover targets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(88)90021-3openalex-snapshot
Managerial competition, information costs, and corporate governance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-xopenalex-snapshot
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(77)90043-5openalex-snapshot
Tender offers and stockholder returns
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(83)90004-1openalex-snapshot
The market for corporate control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(83)90010-7openalex-snapshot
The rationale behind interfirm tender offers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(83)90018-1openalex-snapshot
On corporate governance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90030-xopenalex-snapshot
Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6openalex-snapshot
Managerial control of voting rights
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90040-2openalex-snapshot
Corporate control contests and capital structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90046-3openalex-snapshot
Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90047-5openalex-snapshot
Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7openalex-snapshot
Management ownership and market valuation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90049-9openalex-snapshot
The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90050-5openalex-snapshot
Poison pill securities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(89)90004-4openalex-snapshot
Proxy contests and the governance of publicly held corporations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(89)90084-6openalex-snapshot
Managers' voting rights and corporate control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(89)90085-8openalex-snapshot
The wealth effects of second-generation state takeover legislation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(90)90011-nopenalex-snapshot
Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/259000openalex-snapshot
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/259012openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Large Managerial Firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261354openalex-snapshot
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261385openalex-snapshot
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/296114openalex-snapshot
Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/296610openalex-snapshot
Corporate Governance Through the Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/467041openalex-snapshot
The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/5.2.181openalex-snapshot
Capital and Ownership Structures, and the Market for Corporate Control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb02909.xopenalex-snapshot
PREDICTING THE RESULTS OF PROXY CONTESTS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb03922.xopenalex-snapshot
The Pricing Effects of Interfirm Cash Tender Offers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb03938.xopenalex-snapshot
An Empirical Test of the Impact of Managerial Self-Interest on Corporate Capital Structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb02679.xopenalex-snapshot
Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04622.xopenalex-snapshot
Capital Structure and the Market for Corporate Control: The Defensive Role of Debt Financing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2328673openalex-snapshot
Corporate Control and the Choice of Investment Financing: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2331141openalex-snapshot
The Role of Asset Structure, Ownership Structure, and Takeover Defenses in Determining Acquisition Likelihood
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003333openalex-snapshot
Corporate Control and Managerial Misrepresentation of Firm Performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003400openalex-snapshot
Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003669openalex-snapshot
Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3665876openalex-snapshot
Capital Structure and Ownership Distribution of Tender Offer Targets: An Empirical Study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt9qdsck.5openalex-snapshot
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.9783/9781512805871openalex-snapshot
Prices

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1332openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3162221openalex-extracted
The Intra-Industry Effects of Proxy Contests
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.81808openalex-extracted
The Market for Corporate Control (Including Takeovers)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s12197-019-09492-6openalex-snapshot
The intra-industry effects of proxy contests
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00046-9openalex-snapshot
Proxy contests and corporate change: implications for shareholder wealth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s1479-361x(00)01006-1openalex-snapshot
Corporate governance, corporate control and takeovers
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1057/9780230116665_12openalex-snapshot
Origins of “Offensive” Shareholder Activism in the United States
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/10.4.1065openalex-snapshot
Communication Costs, Information Acquisition, and Voting Decisions in Proxy Contests
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/03074351011027510openalex-snapshot
Capital structure and outcome of proxy contest targets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/s1479-361x20200000019008openalex-snapshot
Hostile Takeover: Who Benefits from Virtual Business Combination?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00787.xopenalex-snapshot
Tender Offers, Proxy Contests, and Large-Shareholder Activism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6288.1996.tb00863.xopenalex-snapshot
CEO Influence and Executive Compensation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.22495/cocv2i4p8openalex-snapshot
Ownership structure and proxy contest without proxy trading: Evidence from Taiwan securities markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3386/w7085openalex-snapshot
Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3917/rfse.004.0155openalex-snapshot
Responsabilité sociale des entreprises et capitalisme financier : pourquoi la régulation fait défaut
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