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Strategic Auditing for Fraud.

https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-9403090156
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0openalex-snapshot
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90113-8openalex-snapshot
Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(85)90035-0openalex-snapshot
Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(93)90091-7openalex-snapshot
Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/259394openalex-snapshot
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/259646openalex-snapshot
The Optimum Enforcement of Laws
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911195openalex-snapshot
Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297481openalex-snapshot
Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2316932openalex-snapshot
Introductory Real Analysis.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2490331openalex-snapshot
Optimal Contracts with Costly Conditional Auditing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2490332openalex-snapshot
Discussion of Optimal Contracts with Costly Conditional Auditing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2490338openalex-snapshot
Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2490913openalex-snapshot
Stochastic Monitoring and Moral Hazard
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2491016openalex-snapshot
Optimal Contracts with a Utility-Maximizing Auditor
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2526692openalex-snapshot
Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555715openalex-snapshot
Optimal Monitoring Policies in Agencies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2937855openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1310914openalex-extracted
The Auditor's Slippery Slope: The Ill Effects of Reputation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1762583openalex-extracted
Fraud Cycles
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2321078openalex-extracted
Aggressive Reporting and Probabilistic Auditing in a Principles-Based Environment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.250413openalex-extracted
Detecting Falsified Financial Statements Using Multicriteria Analysis: The Case of Greece
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2518094openalex-extracted
Sexism, Statements, and Audits
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Theory of Auditing Economics: A Review of Analytical Auditing Research
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Executive Compensation and Investor Clientele
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.993400openalex-extracted
Does Audit Tenure Lead to More Fraud? A Game-Theoretic Approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-77247-9_15openalex-snapshot
Strategic Audit Policies Without Commitment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf02918230openalex-snapshot
Allocating audit resources to detect fraud
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-017-1356-9openalex-snapshot
Optimal auditing of social benefit fraud: a case study
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(90)90051-iopenalex-snapshot
Evading, auditing and taxing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(93)90091-7openalex-snapshot
Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(95)00023-2openalex-snapshot
Audit the taxpayer, not the return: Tax auditing as an expression game
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2020.100455openalex-snapshot
A survey of models for determining optimal audit strategies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2014.12.021openalex-snapshot
A probability tree model of audit quality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2024.01.011openalex-snapshot
Does audit quality affect firm innovation?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.009openalex-snapshot
When words are not enough
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.knosys.2010.10.003openalex-snapshot
A support vector machine-based model for detecting top management fraud
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0361-3682(98)00067-1openalex-snapshot
Knowing efficiency: the enactment of efficiency in efficiency auditing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1008393707313openalex-snapshot
Microstructure of Firms' Disclosure
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1021355104022openalex-snapshot
Financial Statement Audits,a Game of Chicken?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/0963818022000000966openalex-snapshot
Detecting falsified financial statements: a comparative study using multicriteria analysis and multivariate statistical techniques
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/02686900210424321openalex-snapshot
Detecting false financial statements using published data: some evidence from Greece
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/s1041-7060(2010)0000015009openalex-snapshot
The game of fraudulent financial reporting: accounting for ethics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/ccis.2012.6664619openalex-snapshot
Estimation of earnings manipulation in U.S. listed companies based on weighted discriminative model
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036x.2007.00429.xopenalex-snapshot
Social Networks and Corporate Governance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-053x.2005.tb00098.xopenalex-snapshot
A Cognitive Theory of Corporate Disclosures
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1134/s2070048221010038openalex-snapshot
General Equilibrium Model with Tax Audit and Endogenous Choice between Labor Market and Self-Employment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0905openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auditing with Scoring: Theory and Application to Insurance Fraud
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1166openalex-snapshot
The Auditor's Slippery Slope: An Analysis of Reputational Incentives
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.14311/nnw.2014.24.028openalex-snapshot
DETECTION OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION MANIPULATION BY AN ENSEMBLE-BASED MECHANISM
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1504/ijbaf.2008.021023openalex-snapshot
Auditor tenure, managerial fraud and report qualification: a behavioural game-theoretic approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1504/ijbaf.2012.047357openalex-snapshot
Is honesty the best policy? A game theory perspective of auditing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1504/ijmfa.2014.060499openalex-snapshot
Corporate governance and financial authority sanctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1920/wp.ifs.2017.1708openalex-snapshot
Tax avoidance and optimal income tax enforcement
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.20948/mm-2020-05-06openalex-snapshot
Модель общего равновесия с налоговым аудитом и эндогенным выбором между рынком труда и самозанятостью
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i3c2p2openalex-snapshot
Corporate governance and financial markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i4c2p2openalex-snapshot
Executive compensation and investor clientele
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2001.76.1.59openalex-snapshot
The Influence of Potentially Fraudulent Reports on Audit Risk Assessment and Planning
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