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Comparing Strategic Secrecy and Stackelberg Commitment in Security Games
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-35209-0_2openalex-snapshot
Combining Game Theory and Risk Analysis in Counterterrorism: A Smallpox Example
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_13openalex-snapshot
Approximate Solutions for Attack Graph Games with Imperfect Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00933155openalex-snapshot
On generalized Stackelberg strategies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2010.07.002openalex-snapshot
Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: Addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511973031.008openalex-snapshot
Computing Optimal Randomized Resource Allocations for Massive Security Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2010.491668openalex-snapshot
SECRECY AND DECEPTION AT EQUILIBRIUM, WITH APPLICATIONS TO ANTI‐TERRORISM RESOURCE ALLOCATION
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1108/eb022950openalex-snapshot
Advanced Techniques for Modeling Terrorism Risk
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/gamenets.2009.5137463openalex-snapshot
Stochastic games for security in networks with interdependent nodes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/icc.2009.5199443openalex-snapshot
Security Games with Incomplete Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1050.0231openalex-snapshot
A Two-Sided Optimization for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v26i1.8436openalex-snapshot
PROTECT: An Application of Computational Game Theory for the Security of the Ports of the United States
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v28i1.8794openalex-snapshot
Game-Theoretic Resource Allocation for Protecting Large Public Events
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v28i2.19018openalex-snapshot
Robust Protection of Fisheries with COmPASS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v29i1.9290openalex-snapshot
Exploring Information Asymmetry in Two-Stage Security Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v29i1.9323openalex-snapshot
Security Games with Protection Externalities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v30i1.10028openalex-snapshot
Computing Optimal Monitoring Strategy for Detecting Terrorist Plots
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v30i1.10030openalex-snapshot
Optimizing Personalized Email Filtering Thresholds to Mitigate Sequential Spear Phishing Attacks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v30i2.19070openalex-snapshot
Deploying PAWS: Field Optimization of the Protection Assistant for Wildlife Security
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911016openalex-snapshot
A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5555/2030470.2030518openalex-snapshot
A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5555/2484920.2484958openalex-snapshot
Security games with surveillance cost and optimal timing of attack execution
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/nav.22231openalex-snapshot
Signaling the Capability of New Counterterrorism Technologies in the Face of a Strategic Threat
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37231-6_7openalex-snapshot
Target Information Trading - An Economic Perspective of Security
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46150-8_42openalex-snapshot
Learning to Signal in the Goldilocks Zone: Improving Adversary Compliance in Security Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55692-1_3openalex-snapshot
Be Careful When Learning Against Adversaries: Imitative Attacker Deception in Stackelberg Security Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64793-3_2openalex-snapshot
Learning and Planning in the Feature Deception Problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90370-1_4openalex-snapshot
Countering Attacker Data Manipulation in Security Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90370-1_6openalex-snapshot
Learning Generative Deception Strategies in Combinatorial Masking Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26369-9_1openalex-snapshot
The Risk of Attacker Behavioral Learning: Can Attacker Fool Defender Under Uncertainty?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26369-9_2openalex-snapshot
Casino Rationale: Countering Attacker Deception in Zero-Sum Stackelberg Security Games of Bounded Rationality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.008openalex-snapshot
Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105620openalex-snapshot
Optimal transparency of monitoring capability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-38460-8openalex-snapshot
Zero-determinant strategy in stochastic Stackelberg asymmetric security game
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-026-37843-xopenalex-snapshot
Research on infrastructure network protection strategy based on bayesian stackelberg game under asymmetric conditions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/compsac.2019.00075openalex-snapshot
Learning Distributed Cooperative Policies for Security Games via Deep Reinforcement Learning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2022.3155294openalex-snapshot
Single-Leader-Multiple-Followers Stackelberg Security Game With Hypergame Framework
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/tnet.2021.3073273openalex-snapshot
The Value of Traded Target Information in Security Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12812openalex-snapshot
Modeling bluffing behavior in signaling security games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11447openalex-snapshot
Strategic Coordination of Human Patrollers and Mobile Sensors With Signaling for Security Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33012133openalex-snapshot
Deception in Finitely Repeated Security Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5494openalex-snapshot
End-to-End Game-Focused Learning of Adversary Behavior in Security Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v36i9.21172openalex-snapshot
When Can the Defender Effectively Deceive Attackers in Security Games?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v37i8.26115openalex-snapshot
Behavioral Learning in Security Games: Threat of Multi-Step Manipulative Attacks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.23919/ecc65951.2025.11186931openalex-snapshot
Existence and construction of zero-determinant strategy for moving target defense
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.23919/jsee.2024.000006openalex-snapshot
Equilibrium Learning for Multi-Stage Cyber-Physical Multi-Domain Security Game in Island Air Defense
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/732openalex-snapshot
Game Theoretic Analysis of Security and Sustainability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/775openalex-snapshot
Stackelberg Security Games: Looking Beyond a Decade of Success
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/75openalex-snapshot
Imitative Attacker Deception in Stackelberg Security Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/40openalex-snapshot
Partial Adversarial Behavior Deception in Security Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/52openalex-snapshot
When to Follow the Tip: Security Games with Strategic Informants
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3233/faia200091openalex-snapshot
Decoding the Imitation Security Game: Handling Attacker Imitative Behavior Deception
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3233/faia200092openalex-snapshot
Tackling Imitative Attacker Deception in Repeated Bayesian Stackelberg Security Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3390/g13060081openalex-snapshot
A Complete Analysis on the Risk of Using Quantal Response: When Attacker Maliciously Changes Behavior under Uncertainty
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3390/math12162532openalex-snapshot
Signaling Security Games with Attack Planner Deception
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