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Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2639openalex-snapshot
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0051-xopenalex-snapshot
Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0openalex-snapshot
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(88)90038-4openalex-snapshot
Information constrained insurance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.009openalex-snapshot
Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.015openalex-snapshot
Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105000openalex-snapshot
Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(00)00057-xopenalex-snapshot
Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(96)00849-xopenalex-snapshot
Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511610240.006openalex-snapshot
The Economics of Multidimensional Screening
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/257678openalex-snapshot
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rds025openalex-snapshot
Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00033openalex-snapshot
Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00164openalex-snapshot
Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00335.xopenalex-snapshot
BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND DEMAND REDUCTION IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING‐BID AUCTIONS*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00551.xopenalex-snapshot
On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.12.3779openalex-snapshot
Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20140494openalex-snapshot
Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.46.2.333openalex-snapshot
Transfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets the Data
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2913023openalex-snapshot
Mechanism Design with Financially Constrained Agents and Costly Verification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2019.11.002openalex-snapshot
A New Evaluation Criterion for Allocation Mechanisms with Application to Vehicle License Allocations in China
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1906925openalex-snapshot
Measuring Marginal Utility by Reactions to Risk
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911125openalex-snapshot
Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912346openalex-snapshot
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297481openalex-snapshot
Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297639openalex-snapshot
Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297737openalex-snapshot
Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2937855openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te3101openalex-snapshot
Costly verification in collective decisions
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4977522openalex-extracted
Bidimensional screening with substitutable attributes
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01463-5openalex-snapshot
Optimal Multi-unit Allocation with Costly Verification
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103062openalex-snapshot
Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2023-0022openalex-snapshot
Assigning Property Rights to Scarce Resources when Individual Wealth Levels are Observable
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4703869openalex-snapshot
Optimal Refugee Status Determination
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4787742openalex-snapshot
Supply Chain Frictions: Ironing with Returns
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7051878openalex-snapshot
Optimal Allocation with Sequential Screening and Costly Verification
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3982/te5088openalex-snapshot
Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
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