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Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0790openalex-snapshot

Algorithmic Mechanism Design

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45465-9_74openalex-snapshot

The Communication Complexity of Approximate Set Packing and Covering

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01726210openalex-snapshot

Multipart pricing of public goods

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.009openalex-snapshot

Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0000(03)00066-7openalex-snapshot

Near-optimal hardness results and approximation algorithms for edge-disjoint paths and related problems

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/sfcs.2001.959924openalex-snapshot

Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/sfcs.2003.1238230openalex-snapshot

Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/sfcs.2005.76openalex-snapshot

Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.xopenalex-snapshot

COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060597openalex-snapshot

Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060681openalex-snapshot

Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1064009.1064013openalex-snapshot

On the computational power of iterative auctions

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/501158.501172openalex-snapshot

An efficient approximate allocation algorithm for combinatorial auctions

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/585265.585266openalex-snapshot

Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/780542.780616openalex-snapshot

Reducing truth-telling online mechanisms to online optimization

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/846241.846250openalex-snapshot

Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1914085openalex-snapshot

Incentives in Teams

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297996openalex-snapshot

Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5555/314613.314768openalex-snapshot

On approximating rectangle tiling and packing

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5555/644108.644144openalex-snapshot

An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5555/777092.777153openalex-snapshot

Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/8637.003.0011openalex-snapshot

Combinatorial Auctions

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0003openalex-snapshot

Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3912928openalex-extracted

Quantifying the Inefficiency of Multi-unit Auctions for Normal Goods

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-09680-3_2openalex-snapshot

Algorithmic Game Theory: Some Greatest Hits and Future Directions

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3openalex-snapshot

Algorithmic Game Theory

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70575-8_68openalex-snapshot

Truthful Unification Framework for Packing Integer Programs with Choices

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_65openalex-snapshot

Characterizing Truthful Market Design

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03685-9_5openalex-snapshot

Truthful Mechanisms via Greedy Iterative Packing

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22935-0_22openalex-snapshot

Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/springerreference_57528openalex-snapshot

Algorithmic Mechanism Design, 1999; Nisan, Ronen

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2010.08.005openalex-snapshot

Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2007.41openalex-snapshot

Towards Sharp Inapproximability For Any 2-CSP

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2011.90openalex-snapshot

Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/icpads.2013.60openalex-snapshot

SAIL: A Strategy-Proof Auction Mechanism for Cooperative Communication

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/sfcs.2005.76openalex-snapshot

Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/tnet.2015.2437200openalex-snapshot

AEGIS: An Unknown Combinatorial Auction Mechanism Framework for Heterogeneous Spectrum Redistribution in Noncooperative Wireless Networks

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973105.42openalex-snapshot

Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/1536414.1536484openalex-snapshot

A new approach to auctions and resilient mechanism design

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2422436.2422463openalex-snapshot

Approaching utopia

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602857openalex-snapshot

Knightian self uncertainty in the vcg mechanism for unrestricted combinatorial auctions

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-532-6-150openalex-snapshot

Mechanism Design and Strong Truthfulness

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3390/g7040032openalex-snapshot

Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3982/ecta12131openalex-snapshot

Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1106.0961openalex-snapshot

Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1208.3939openalex-snapshot

Approaching Utopia: Strong Truthfulness and Externality-Resistant Mechanisms

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1403.6413openalex-snapshot

Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1906.03286openalex-snapshot

Dynamic First Price Auctions Robust to Heterogeneous Buyers

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5555/1496770.1496851openalex-snapshot

Stepwise randomized combinatorial auctions achieve revenue monotonicity

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5555/1496770.1496907openalex-snapshot

An online mechanism for ad slot reservations with cancellations

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