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On regular and approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74208-1_15openalex-snapshot
Approximation Algorithms for the Max-Min Allocation Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-012-9328-4openalex-snapshot
A survey of approximability and inapproximability results for social welfare optimization in multiagent resource allocation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/b:josh.0000036858.59787.c2openalex-snapshot
Minimizing Makespan in a Two-Machine Flow Shop with Delays and Unit-Time Operations is NP-Hard
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2009.51openalex-snapshot
On Allocating Goods to Maximize Fairness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/080723491openalex-snapshot
An Approximation Algorithm for Max-Min Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1082473.1082747openalex-snapshot
Allocation of indivisible goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1536414.1536488openalex-snapshot
MaxMin allocation via degree lower-bounded arborescences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1184/r1/6607142openalex-snapshot
Max-min fair allocation of indivisible goods
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-015-9287-3openalex-snapshot
Characterizing conflicts in fair division of indivisible goods using a scale of criteria
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2015.06.002openalex-snapshot
Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.002openalex-snapshot
Teams formation: Efficiency and approximate fairness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16670openalex-snapshot
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.13779openalex-snapshot
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/13openalex-snapshot
Fair Division Under Cardinality Constraints
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/20openalex-snapshot
Maximin-Aware Allocations of Indivisible Goods
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/316openalex-snapshot
Fair Division of a Graph into Compact Bundles
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1507.06827openalex-snapshot
Egalitarianism of Random Assignment Mechanisms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1804.09521openalex-snapshot
Fair Division Under Cardinality Constraints
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5555/2615731.2617456openalex-snapshot
Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5555/2615731.2617458openalex-snapshot
Characterizing conflicts in fair division of indivisible goods using a scale of criteria
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.65109/auxi8882openalex-snapshot
Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.65109/ayhc6673openalex-snapshot
Guaranteeing Half-Maximin Shares Under Cardinality Constraints
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