Reference health
Within- and Cross-Auction Geographic License Complementarities in FCC Spectrum Auctions
35/35 checkable references clean · checked 2026-10-11
Every reference with a DOI or an arXiv id in the deposited reference list resolved to a known
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The 35 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1086/432138Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data
resolves10.1111/1467-937X.00211Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
resolves10.1086/661939Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services
resolves10.1086/657948Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions: An Empirical Analysis of the Turkish Treasury Auction Market
resolves10.2307/1907742Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
resolves10.1086/467408What's in the Air: Interlicense Synergies in the Federal Communications Commission's Broadband Personal Communication Service Spectrum Auctions
resolves10.2307/2297496The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
resolves10.2307/2951780The Limiting Distribution of the Maximum Rank Correlation Estimator
resolves10.1023/A:1008202821328Differential Evolution – A Simple and Efficient Heuristic for global Optimization over Continuous Spaces
The 18 references with no DOI or arXiv id, listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedSynergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the MTA Auction
no DOI — not checkedAn Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats
no DOI — not checkedThe Federal Communications Commission
no DOI — not checkedSubmitted to the FCC as part of Reply Comments of CTIA in GN Docket No. 17-258
no DOI — not checkedCollusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions
no DOI — not checkedMeasuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction
no DOI — not checkedAn experimental comparison of flexible and tiered package bidding
no DOI — not checkedColllusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions
no DOI — not checkedref28
no DOI — not checkedDo Auctions Select Efficient Firms?
no DOI — not checkedAn Insiders' View of FCC Spectrum Auctions
no DOI — not checkedUniform-Price Auctions: Update of the Treasury Experience" Department of the Treasury Manski, Charles F. 1975
no DOI — not checkedref40
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Auction Design
no DOI — not checkedref45
no DOI — not checkedFinancing Auction Bids
no DOI — not checkedref52
no DOI — not checkedref53
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