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Within- and Cross-Auction Geographic License Complementarities in FCC Spectrum Auctions

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35/35 checkable references clean · checked 2026-10-11

Every reference with a DOI or an arXiv id in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

18 with no DOI or arXiv id: not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is checked only when it names an arXiv id, under that id’s DataCite DOI. The rest are never matched by title or guessed at; they stay outside the checked set, and this line says so.

The 35 checked references that resolve
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Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions
resolves10.1016/S1573-4412(07)06060-6
Chapter 60 Nonparametric Approaches to Auctions
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Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data
resolves10.1007/s11129-008-9044-x
Evaluating wireless carrier consolidation using semiparametric demand estimation
resolves10.1007/s00199-002-0317-4
Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions
resolves10.1628/0015221022905858
Spectrum Auctions: How They Should and How They Should Not Be Shaped
resolves10.1111/1467-937X.00211
Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
resolves10.2307/2556089
Collusion in Auctions with Externalities
resolves10.1007/s11151-007-9149-5
Economics at the Federal Communications Commission: 2006–2007
resolves10.1086/467410
The Efficiency of the Fcc Spectrum Auctions
resolves10.1086/661939
Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services
resolves10.1023/A:1008174031940
Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions
resolves10.1111/1468-2354.00054
Aggregation in Matching Markets
resolves10.1006/jeth.1997.2306
Stable Networks
resolves10.1287/mnsc.26.2.119
State of the Art—Auctions and Bidding Models: A Survey
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1040.0339
Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions
resolves10.2307/3867445
Auctions: Theory and Applications
resolves10.1162/003355397555307
What Makes Markets Allocationally Efficient?
resolves10.1086/657948
Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions: An Empirical Analysis of the Turkish Treasury Auction Market
resolves10.1006/jeth.1996.0108
A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks
resolves10.1111/1468-0327.00107
An economic perspective on auctions
resolves10.1111/1467-6419.00083
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
resolves10.1257/0895330027166
What Really Matters in Auction Design
resolves10.1093/joclec/nhl017
BIDDING MARKETS
resolves10.2307/1907742
Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02004.x
Collusion and Equilibrium Selection in Auctions
resolves10.1162/003355300554755
Efficient Auctions
resolves10.1257/jep.10.1.159
Analyzing the Airwaves Auction
resolves10.1257/jep.3.3.3
Auctions and Bidding: A Primer
resolves10.1086/467408
What's in the Air: Interlicense Synergies in the Federal Communications Commission's Broadband Personal Communication Service Spectrum Auctions
resolves10.1016/S0308-5961(03)00047-8
The long and winding road: the FCC paves the path with good intentions
resolves10.2307/2297496
The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
resolves10.1007/BF01753437
The assignment game I: The core
resolves10.2307/2951780
The Limiting Distribution of the Maximum Rank Correlation Estimator
resolves10.1023/A:1008202821328
Differential Evolution – A Simple and Efficient Heuristic for global Optimization over Continuous Spaces
The 18 references with no DOI or arXiv id, listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedSynergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the MTA Auction
no DOI — not checkedAn Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats
no DOI — not checkedThe Federal Communications Commission
no DOI — not checkedSubmitted to the FCC as part of Reply Comments of CTIA in GN Docket No. 17-258
no DOI — not checkedCollusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions
no DOI — not checkedMeasuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction
no DOI — not checkedAn experimental comparison of flexible and tiered package bidding
no DOI — not checkedColllusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions
no DOI — not checkedref28
no DOI — not checkedDo Auctions Select Efficient Firms?
no DOI — not checkedAn Insiders' View of FCC Spectrum Auctions
no DOI — not checkedUniform-Price Auctions: Update of the Treasury Experience" Department of the Treasury Manski, Charles F. 1975
no DOI — not checkedref40
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Auction Design
no DOI — not checkedref45
no DOI — not checkedFinancing Auction Bids
no DOI — not checkedref52
no DOI — not checkedref53
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. If Crossref’s record marks the work itself retracted, withdrawn, or removed, the badge says so instead of showing clean. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references with neither a DOI nor an arXiv id.

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