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Within- and Cross-Auction Geographic License Complementarities in FCC Spectrum Auctions
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0108openalex-extracted
A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0317-4openalex-extracted
Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-007-9149-5openalex-extracted
Economics at the Federal Communications Commission: 2006–2007
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0308-5961(03)00047-8openalex-extracted
The long and winding road: the FCC paves the path with good intentions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s1573-4412(07)06060-6openalex-extracted
Chapter 60 Nonparametric Approaches to Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316471609.028openalex-extracted
An Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1008202821328openalex-extracted
Differential Evolution – A Simple and Efficient Heuristic for global Optimization over Continuous Spaces
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/466549openalex-extracted
The Federal Communications Commission
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/467408openalex-extracted
What's in the Air: Interlicense Synergies in the Federal Communications Commission's Broadband Personal Communication Service Spectrum Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/467410openalex-extracted
The Efficiency of the Fcc Spectrum Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/657948openalex-extracted
Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions: An Empirical Analysis of the Turkish Treasury Auction Market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/661939openalex-extracted
Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6419.00083openalex-extracted
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00211openalex-extracted
Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0327.00107openalex-extracted
An economic perspective on auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.00054openalex-extracted
Aggregation in Matching Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02004.xopenalex-extracted
Collusion and Equilibrium Selection in Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02334.xopenalex-extracted
Do Auctions Select Efficient Firms?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12291openalex-extracted
Efficiency or Competition? A Structural Econometric Analysis of Canada's AWS Auction and the Set‐Aside Provision
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555307openalex-extracted
What Makes Markets Allocationally Efficient?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.10.3288openalex-extracted
Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.1.39openalex-extracted
An Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.1.100openalex-extracted
Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0339openalex-extracted
Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.26.2.119openalex-extracted
State of the Art—Auctions and Bidding Models: A Survey
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1628/0015221022905858openalex-extracted
Spectrum Auctions: How They Should and How They Should Not Be Shaped
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0645.1078openalex-extracted
Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297496openalex-extracted
The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2556089openalex-extracted
Collusion in Auctions with Externalities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951780openalex-extracted
The Limiting Distribution of the Maximum Rank Correlation Estimator
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w11671openalex-extracted
Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315699868-248openalex-extracted
Federal Communications Commission
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11129-008-9044-xopenalex-snapshot
Evaluating wireless carrier consolidation using semiparametric demand estimation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1008174031940openalex-snapshot
Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/432138openalex-snapshot
Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0895330027166openalex-snapshot
What Really Matters in Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1907742openalex-snapshot
Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1556/2065.182.2021.2.9openalex-snapshot
Árverések – elmélettől a gyakorlatig: a 2020-as közgazdasági Nobel-emlékdíjról • Auctions – from Theory to Applications: On the 2020 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
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