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Explaining High Conjunction Fallacy Rates: The Probability Theory Plus Noise Account
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-0771(199709)10:3<157::aid-bdm260>3.0.co;2-#openalex-snapshot
On the Importance of Random Error in the Study of Probability Judgment. Part I: New Theoretical Developments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-0771(199912)12:4<275::aid-bdm323>3.0.co;2-mopenalex-snapshot
The ‘conjunction fallacy’ revisited: how intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1818openalex-snapshot
Are People Naïve Probability Theorists? A Further Examination of the Probability Theory + Variation Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.618openalex-snapshot
How probability theory explains the conjunction fallacy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.623openalex-snapshot
Fallacies in probability judgments for conjunctions and disjunctions of everyday events
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.650openalex-snapshot
Semantic coherence and fallacies in estimating joint probabilities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02294144openalex-snapshot
A Family of Association Coefficients for Metric Scales
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02295594openalex-snapshot
A Family of Chance-Corrected Association Coefficients for Metric Scales
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0001-6918(95)00048-8openalex-snapshot
Component probabilities and the conjunction fallacy: Resolving signed summation and the low component model in a contingent approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9openalex-snapshot
Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(89)90014-9openalex-snapshot
Disjunction errors in qualitative likelihood judgment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.08.003openalex-snapshot
Testing boundary conditions for the conjunction fallacy: Effects of response mode, conceptual focus, and problem type
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.07.006openalex-snapshot
On the provenance of judgments of conditional probability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.08.012openalex-snapshot
Surprising rationality in probability judgment: Assessing two competing models
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2016.06.006openalex-snapshot
People’s conditional probability judgments follow probability theory (plus noise)
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsci.2004.01.001openalex-snapshot
The conjunction fallacy: a misunderstanding about conjunction?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lindif.2007.03.011openalex-snapshot
Numeracy, ratio bias, and denominator neglect in judgments of risk and probability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511997716openalex-snapshot
Quantum Models of Cognition and Decision
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.61.2.181openalex-snapshot
Representativeness and conjoint probability.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295x.101.3.519openalex-snapshot
Simultaneous over- and underconfidence: The role of error in judgment processes.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295x.106.1.180openalex-snapshot
MINERVA-DM: A memory processes model for judgments of likelihood.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293openalex-snapshot
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016979openalex-snapshot
Probability theory, not the very guide of life.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/a0017351openalex-snapshot
Linda is not a bearded lady: Configural weighting and adding as the cause of extension errors.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022542openalex-snapshot
A quantum theoretical explanation for probability judgment errors.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/a0025940openalex-snapshot
Toward a synthesis of cognitive biases: How noisy information processing can bias human decision making.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028770openalex-snapshot
On the determinants of the conjunction fallacy: Confirmation versus probability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029869openalex-snapshot
Adaptive constructive processes and the future of memory.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/a0037010openalex-snapshot
Surprisingly rational: Probability theory plus noise explains biases in judgment.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/a0039249openalex-snapshot
Heuristics can produce surprisingly rational probability estimates: Comment on Costello and Watts (2014).
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000018openalex-snapshot
Probability theory plus noise: Replies to Crupi and Tentori (2016) and to Nilsson, Juslin, and Winman (2016).
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/027249898391576openalex-snapshot
Conditional Probabilities, Potential Surprise, and the Conjunction Fallacy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/13546780701643406openalex-snapshot
Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/713755770openalex-snapshot
Conditional Probabilities, Potential Surprise, and the Conjunction Fallacy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199957996.013.17openalex-snapshot
Quantum Models of Cognition and Decision
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.00275.xopenalex-snapshot
How People Make Decisions That Involve Risk
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00254.xopenalex-snapshot
A Different Conjunction Fallacy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346openalex-snapshot
Heuristic Decision Making
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog2803_8openalex-snapshot
The conjunction fallacy: a misunderstanding about conjunction?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1423333openalex-snapshot
The Conjunction Effect: New Evidence for Robustness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3758/bf03195280openalex-snapshot
On the reality of the conjunction fallacy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3758/bf03210779openalex-snapshot
The conjunction fallacy: A test of averaging hypotheses
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3758/pbr.16.2.225openalex-snapshot
Bayesian t tests for accepting and rejecting the null hypothesis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.46-0969openalex-snapshot
Predictably irrational: the hidden forces that shape our decisions
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Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
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Confirmation and Dual Conjunction Errors—Extending the CF Formula’s “ A→B Paradigm” Interpretation
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Frequency estimation and semantic ambiguity do not eliminate conjunction bias, when it occurs: Replication and extension of Mellers, Hertwig, and Kahneman (2001)
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The Epistemology of the Near Miss and Its Potential Contribution in the Prevention and Treatment of Problem-Gambling
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