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Surprisingly rational: Probability theory plus noise explains biases in judgment.

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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The ‘conjunction fallacy’ revisited: how intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors
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MINERVA‐DM and subadditive frequency judgments
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How probability theory explains the conjunction fallacy
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Fallacies in probability judgments for conjunctions and disjunctions of everyday events
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The dependence of the conjunction fallacy on subtle linguistic factors
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Systematic errors in medical decision making:
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Confirmation in the Cognitive Sciences: The Problematic Case of Bayesian Models
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Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
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Disjunction errors in qualitative likelihood judgment
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The Probable and the Possible at 12 Months
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Heuristic reasoning and cognitive biases: Are they hindrances to judgments and decision making in orthodontics?
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Bayesian learning and the psychology of rule induction
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The conjunction fallacy: a misunderstanding about conjunction?
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Probabilistic models of cognition: Conceptual foundations
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Conservatism in human information processing
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Bayesian Fundamentalism or Enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition
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Automatic processing of fundamental information: The case of frequency of occurrence.
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Representativeness and conjoint probability.
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MINERVA-DM: A memory processes model for judgments of likelihood.
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Decisions based on numerically and verbally expressed uncertainties.
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Support theory: A nonextensional representation of subjective probability.
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Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016979openalex-snapshot
Probability theory, not the very guide of life.
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Toward a synthesis of cognitive biases: How noisy information processing can bias human decision making.
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Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience.
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In defense of probabilistic functionalism: a reply.
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Mice take calculated risks
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Do Frequency Representations Eliminate Conjunction Effects? An Exercise in Adversarial Collaboration
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Heuristics and biases − a biased perspective on clinical reasoning
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Optimal Predictions in Everyday Cognition
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Does the Stock Market Overreact?
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How to Grow a Mind: Statistics, Structure, and Abstraction
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How Robust Are Probabilistic Models of Higher-Level Cognition?
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Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics
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Behavioral Law and Economics
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Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics
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On the reality of the conjunction fallacy
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The conjunction fallacy: A test of averaging hypotheses

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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Evaluating the Role of Mental Sampling in Probability Judgments: Illogical Rankings Occur in a Predictable Manner
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Relevance insensitivity: A framework of psychological biases in consumer behavior and beyond
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Eliciting Subjective Probabilities through Pair‐wise Comparisons
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Explaining High Conjunction Fallacy Rates: The Probability Theory Plus Noise Account
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Noisy Retrieval of Experienced Probabilities Underlies Rational Judgment of Uncertain Multiple Events
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Ratio Bias Across Cultures and Disciplines: How Academic Background Shapes Statistical Decision‐Making
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Quantum-Like Model of Subjective Expected Utility: A Survey of Applications to Finance
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Compositional Distributional Semantics and the Conjunction Effect in Language Models
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Modelling decision-making within rail maintenance control rooms
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Subjective beliefs and confidence when facts are forgotten
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Quantum logics in cognition: A proposal
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Discovering Common Hidden Causes in Sequences of Events
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Comparing Probabilistic Accounts of Probability Judgments
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Models of Variability in Probabilistic Causal Judgments
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Testing the Generalizability of the Priority Heuristic to Two-Stage Decision Making Tasks: A Comparison to Quantum Cognition and Prospect Theory
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Preservice teachers’ recognition of source and content bias in educational application (app) reviews
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Surprising rationality in probability judgment: Assessing two competing models
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Compound risk judgment in tasks with both idiosyncratic and systematic risk: The “Robust Beauty” of additive probability integration
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Basic functional trade-offs in cognition: An integrative framework
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Neurocognitive processes underlying heuristic and normative probability judgments
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Can conditionals explain explanations? A modus ponens model of B because A
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On the generality and cognitive basis of base-rate neglect
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Evaluating the role of mental sampling in probability judgments: Illogical rankings occur in a predictable manner
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A rational process model of reasoning causally with continuous variables
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People’s conditional probability judgments follow probability theory (plus noise)
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Where do hypotheses come from?
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Invariants in probabilistic reasoning
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Variable time preference
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Modeling choice paradoxes under risk: From prospect theories to sampling-based accounts
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Random variation and systematic biases in probability estimation
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Lossy encoding of distributions in judgment under uncertainty
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Evolution of a theory of mind
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The anti-money laundering risk assessment: A probabilistic approach
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Quantum-like model of subjective expected utility
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Probability interference in expected utility theory
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Quantum like modeling of decision making: Quantifying uncertainty with the aid of Heisenberg–Robertson inequality
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Models of human probability judgment errors
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Confidence as Bayesian Probability: From Neural Origins to Behavior
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Relevance insensitivity: A new look at some old biases
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People as Intuitive Scientists: Reconsidering Statistical Explanations of Decision Making
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Computational Approaches
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Approximating Bayesian Inference through Internal Sampling
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Escaping Paternalism
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Preface
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Introduction
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What Is Rationality?
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Rationality for Puppets
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Preference Biases
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The Rationality of Beliefs
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Deficient Foundations for Behavioral Policymaking
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Knowledge Problems in Paternalist Policymaking
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The Political Economy of Paternalist Policymaking
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Slippery Slopes in Paternalist Policymaking
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Common Threads, Escape Routes, and Paths Forward
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References
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Index
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Combining meta-learned models with process models of cognition
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George Miller’s magical number of immediate memory in retrospect: Observations on the faltering progression of science.
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Noisy probability judgment, the conjunction fallacy, and rationality: Comment on Costello and Watts (2014).
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Why contextual preference reversals maximize expected value.
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An item response approach to calibration of confidence judgments.
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The rationality of illusory correlation.
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Norm conflicts and conditionals.
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The Bayesian sampler: Generic Bayesian inference causes incoherence in human probability judgments.
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The similarity-updating model of probability judgment and belief revision.
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Toward nonprobabilistic explanations of learning and decision-making.
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Further perceptions of probability: In defence of associative models.
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The autocorrelated Bayesian sampler: A rational process for probability judgments, estimates, confidence intervals, choices, confidence judgments, and response times.
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Risk matters less when options are apples-to-oranges: The translate-and-accommodate model.
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The rational status of quantum cognition.
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A quantum probability framework for human probabilistic inference.
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Explaining the implicit negations effect in conditional inference: Experience, probabilities, and contrast sets.
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A unified explanation of variability and bias in human probability judgments: How computational noise explains the mean–variance signature.
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A re-examination of “bias” in human randomness perception.
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Subjective probability is modulated by emotions
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Boundedly Rational Decision-Making under Certainty and Uncertainty: Some Reflections on Herbert Simon
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Iconic Prioritization and Representational Silence in Emotion
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Knowledge and availability
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Prior convictions, conduct and disposition: a scientific perspective
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When even the smartest fail to prioritise: overuse of information can decrease decision accuracy
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An evaluation of the role of inductive confirmation in relation to the conjunction fallacy
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Sampling as the Human Approximation to Probabilistic Inference
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Noise and opinion dynamics: how ambiguity promotes pro-majority consensus in the presence of confirmation bias
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Bistable probabilities: a unified framework for studying rationality and irrationality in classical and quantum games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1101/2020.01.30.927558openalex-snapshot
Further Perceptions of Probability: In Defence of Associative Models – A Commentary on Gallistel et al. 2014
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Probability weighting arises from boundary repulsions of cognitive noise
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Dynamical Model of Overconfidence Phenomena Due to ZE-Type Confirmation Bias
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Bayesians Commit the Gambler's Fallacy
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Computational Models of Causal Reasoning: Bayesian Accounts of Normative Violations
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An account of subjective probability judgment for joint events: Conjunctive and disjunctive
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Probability Theory Plus Noise: Descriptive Estimation and Inferential Judgment
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Quantum Cognition
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The Bayesian Mutation Sampler Explains Distributions of Causal Judgments
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Two Determinants of Dynamic Adaptive Learning for Magnitudes and Probabilities
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On the Robustness and Provenance of the Gambler’s Fallacy
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Probabilistic Biases Meet the Bayesian Brain
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Bayesian modeling of expert elicitation in human reliability analysis: Theoretical foundations and model development
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Confirmation and Dual Conjunction Errors—Extending the CF Formula’s “ A→B Paradigm” Interpretation
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Age-dependent Pavlovian biases influence motor decision-making
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Individual Differences in the Perception of Probability
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Explaining the flaws in human random generation as local sampling with momentum
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Probabilistic causal reasoning under time pressure
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When noise mitigates bias in human–algorithm decision-making: An agent-based model
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Biomarker – vom Sein und Wesen
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On reverse processes related to post-soviet Russia development
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Institutional trust and institutions’ effectiveness in difficult straits in views of Russians
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Probability Distributions of Common Repeated Events are Misestimated
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Does Outcome Utility Bias the Mental Simulations of Risky Events?
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Bayesians Commit the Gambler's Fallacy
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Lossy encoding of distributions in judgment under uncertainty
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Probability Distributions of Common Repeated Events Are Misestimated.
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Modeling Choice Paradoxes Under Risk: From Prospect Theories to Sampling-Based Accounts
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Probabilistic Reasoning with Transformer Networks: An Application to Predicate Judgment
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Cognitive reflection and Normality Identities: two new benchmarks for models of probability judgments
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Review: Models of Human Probability Judgment Errors
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Investigation of Biases and Compensatory Strategies Using a Probabilistic Variant of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
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Is There a Conjunction Fallacy in Legal Probabilistic Decision Making?
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Divergent patterns of probabilistic reasoning in humans and GPT-5
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On the Irrationality of Being in Two Minds
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Quantum Circuit Components for Cognitive Decision-Making
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What Is Rational and Irrational in Human Decision Making
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A quantum theory account of order effects and conjunction fallacies in political judgments
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Precise/not precise (PNP): A Brunswikian model that uses judgment error distributions to identify cognitive processes
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An overview of the quantum cognition research program
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Probabilities of conditionals: The relevance effect might be confounded by the existence of boundary cases
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A large-scale study into human judgments: New evidence for probabilistic fallacies
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Parallel Interactive Processing as a Way to Understand Complex Information Processing: The Conjunction Fallacy and Other Examples
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On the role of deduction in reasoning from uncertain premises
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A new probabilistic explanation of the Modus Ponens–Modus Tollens asymmetry
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