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Optimal delegation choices in the presence of an incongruent performance measure and double moral hazard
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.1434openalex-snapshot
Task assignment, incentives and technological factors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2439openalex-snapshot
Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(94)90104-xopenalex-snapshot
Job design, delegation and cooperation: A principal-agent analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.04.008openalex-snapshot
Profit sharing and monitoring in partnerships
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mar.2012.07.001openalex-snapshot
The value of extended delegation in dynamic agency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2017.1408478openalex-snapshot
Controlling Scarce Working Time in a Multi-task Incentive Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24openalex-snapshot
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewm044openalex-snapshot
Relational Contracts, Multitasking, and Job Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.00004openalex-snapshot
Balancing Performance Measures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.15057/5003openalex-snapshot
JOB DESIGN AND INCENTIVES IN HIERARCHIES WITH TEAM PRODUCTION
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1506/q69y-hlqf-d134-wgu7openalex-snapshot
Production Externalities, Congruity of Aggregate Signals, and Optimal Task Assignments*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1506/v1tu-aw8j-5fya-glpwopenalex-snapshot
Private Predecision Information, Performance Measure Congruity, and the Value of Delegation*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2491075openalex-snapshot
Centralization Versus Delegation and the Value of Communication
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555592openalex-snapshot
Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555686openalex-snapshot
Delegation as Commitment: The Case of Income Tax Audits
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3069615openalex-snapshot
Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2008.83.3.789openalex-snapshot
Optimal Team Size and Monitoring in Organizations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-50654openalex-snapshot
Decentralized Task Assignment and Centralized Contracting: On the Optimal Allocation of Authority
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar.2003.15.1.225openalex-snapshot
Complementarity, Task Assignment, and Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-9412141436openalex-snapshot
Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multi-Task Principal/Agent Relations.
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4765131openalex-extracted
Split or Combined? On the Optimal Assignment of Management Tasks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/bl-02-2025-0030openalex-snapshot
Individual time interval preferences and the impact of recommendation sources: comparing human andAI influence
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