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Split or Combined? On the Optimal Assignment of Management Tasks

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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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Social Performance Incentives in Mission-Driven Firms
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Collaborative by Design? How Matrix Organizations See/Do Alliances
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Authority and Accountability in Hierarchies
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Who Lives in the C-Suite? Organizational Structure and the Division of Labor in Top Management
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3047688openalex-extracted
Incentives and the Delegation of Task Assignment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6658openalex-extracted
Specific and General Knowledge and Organizational Structure
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Monitoring Gains and Decentralization
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Collaborative by Design?How Matrix Organizations See/Do Alliances
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