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Pragmatic probability
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1807-4openalex-snapshot
Rudolf Carnap, Logical Empiricist
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2175-3openalex-snapshot
The Logical Foundations of Statistical Interference
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3173-7openalex-snapshot
Studies in the Methodology and Foundations of Science
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00873264openalex-snapshot
Conditionalization and observation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0049-237x(08)70650-5openalex-snapshot
A Semantical definition of Probability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511662973openalex-snapshot
Introduction to Probability and Statistics from a Bayesian Viewpoint
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781316534960openalex-snapshot
Logic of Statistical Inference
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/23.2.181openalex-snapshot
BAYESIANISM AND THE RATIONALITY OF SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE1
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/x.37.25openalex-snapshot
THE PROPENSITY INTERPRETATION OF PROBABILITY
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1974.tb01549.xopenalex-snapshot
AN OBJECTIVE THEORY OF PROBABILITY
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1969003openalex-snapshot
The Axioms and Algebra of Intuitive Probability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2102968openalex-snapshot
The Semantic Conception of Truth: and the Foundations of Semantics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2268222openalex-snapshot
Fair bets and inductive probabilities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2273956openalex-snapshot
Pragmatic truth and approximation to truth
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2314998openalex-snapshot
Lectures on Functional Equations and their Applications.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.12570393openalex-snapshot
The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71986-1_22openalex-snapshot
Peircean Pragmatic Truth and da Costa’s Quasi-Truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05679-0_8openalex-snapshot
Outline of a Paraconsistent Category Theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_4openalex-snapshot
Mathematical Change and Inconsistency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00485812openalex-snapshot
On Russell's principle of induction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-008-9127-4openalex-snapshot
Structural Realism, Scientific Change, and Partial Structures
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9125-xopenalex-snapshot
Quasi-truth, paraconsistency, and the foundations of science
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-044451541-4/50023-3openalex-snapshot
Paraconsistent Logics and Paraconsistency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2005.09.001openalex-snapshot
Can the constructive empiricist be a nominalist? Quasi-truth, commitment and consistency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0039-3681(97)00012-5openalex-snapshot
Empirical adequacy: A partial structures approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0039-3681(99)00037-0openalex-snapshot
Empiricism, scientific change and mathematical change
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0049-237x(08)70049-1openalex-snapshot
Logic and Pragmatic Truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005238423022openalex-snapshot
Quasi-Truth In Quasi-Set Theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005246608001openalex-snapshot
The Reasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics: Partial Structures and the Application of Group Theory to Physics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005250725748openalex-snapshot
Partial Structures and Jeffrey-Keynes Algebras
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005288605275openalex-snapshot
The quantum and classical domains as provisional parallel coexistents
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005434915055openalex-snapshot
What is Structural Empiricism? Scientific Change in an Empiricist Setting
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/01445349950044152openalex-snapshot
Quasi-Truth, Supervaluations and Free Logic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/02698599308573462openalex-snapshot
A model theoretic approach to ‘natural’ reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/289546openalex-snapshot
The Model-Theoretic Approach in the Philosophy of Science
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/392746openalex-snapshot
Empiricism, Conservativeness, and Quasi-Truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019515651x.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Science and Partial Truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019515651x.003.0002openalex-snapshot
Truth, the Whole Truth, and Partial Truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019515651x.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Acceptance, Belief, and Commitment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019515651x.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Partiality, Pursuit, and Practice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019515651x.003.0008openalex-snapshot
Quasi Truth and the Nature of Induction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/019515651x.003.0009openalex-snapshot
From Pragmatic Realism to Structural Empiricism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/40.3.333openalex-snapshot
Pragmatic Truth and the Logic of Induction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.12743/quanta.v3i1.19openalex-snapshot
Constructive Empiricism, Partial Structures and the Modal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.33889/ijmems.2020.5.5.062openalex-snapshot
Solutions of Ternary Problems of Conditional Probability with Applications to Mathematical Epidemiology and the COVID-19 Pandemic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.47749/t/unicamp.2003.300769openalex-snapshot
Uma teoria da verdade pragmatica
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5007/808-1711.2014v18n2p175openalex-snapshot
Lógicas da justificação e quase-verdade
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.7476/9788526815001openalex-snapshot
Para além das Colunas de Hércules, uma história da paraconsistência: de Heráclito a Newton da Costa
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