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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-81592-0_6openalex-snapshot
Probability and Confirmation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0049-237x(08)71661-6openalex-snapshot
Concept Formation and Bayesian Decisions
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Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability
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Probability and the Weighing of Evidence.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2314998openalex-snapshot
Lectures on Functional Equations and their Applications.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2981046openalex-snapshot
Probability and the Weighing of Evidence.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.12570393openalex-snapshot
The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
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Simulation Validation from a Bayesian Perspective
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Numerical Representation of Uncertainty
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Bayesian Rules of Updating
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An Improved Dutch Book Theorem for Conditionalization
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The Representation of Belief
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Confirmation in the Cognitive Sciences: The Problematic Case of Bayesian Models
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Locating IBE in the Bayesian framework
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Sleeping Beauty and the absent-minded driver
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Weighted averaging, Jeffrey conditioning and invariance
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Acting on belief functions
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The Concept of Rationality for a City
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Varieties of Justification—How (Not) to Solve the Problem of Induction
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The old evidence problem and the inference to the best explanation
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Conditional probability judgments: Effects of imagining vs experiencing the conditioning event
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Probability and Chance: Philosophical Aspects
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Probability and Chance: Philosophical Aspects
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The Bayesian Decision-Theoretic Approach to Statistics
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Varieties of Bayesianism
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Evidential Reasoning in a Categorial Perspective: Conjunction and Disjunction of Belief Functions
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Optimizing group learning: An evolutionary computing approach
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Propensities and conditional probabilities
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Imaging and Sleeping Beauty: A case for double-halfers
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Dynamic consistency in games without expected utility
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The ecological rationality of explanatory reasoning
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Understanding Deutsch's probability in a deterministic multiverse
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Uncomfortable bedfellows: Objective quantum Bayesianism and the von Neumann–Lüders projection postulate
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Van Fraassen's critique of inference to the best explanation
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The Probabilistic Foundations of Rational Learning
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Does Newcomb’s Problem Actually Exist?
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Newcomb’s Problem, Rationality, and Restraint
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The “Why Ain’cha Rich?” Argument
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Epistemic Time Bias in Newcomb’s Problem∗
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Newcomb’s Problem is Everyone’s Problem: Making Political and Economic Decisions when Behavior is Interdependent
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Success-First Decision Theories
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Deliberation and Stability in Newcomb Problems and Pseudo-Newcomb Problems1
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“Click!” Bait for Causalists
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Game Theory and Decision Theory (Causal and Evidential)
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Diagnosing Newcomb’s Problem with Causal Graphs
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Levi on Money Pumps and Diachronic Dutch Books
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Introduction: Philosophical Foundations
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On No-Miracles and the Base-Rate Fallacy
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Précis of Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning
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Explaining norms and norms explained
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The dynamics of development: Challenges for Bayesian rationality
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The Logic of Belief Persistence
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Rational updating at the crossroads
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PLACING PROBABILITIES OF CONDITIONALS IN CONTEXT
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MERGING OF OPINIONS AND PROBABILITY KINEMATICS
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A DUTCH BOOK THEOREM AND CONVERSE DUTCH BOOK THEOREM FOR KOLMOGOROV CONDITIONALIZATION
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ACCURACY AND UR-PRIOR CONDITIONALIZATION
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A NEW ARGUMENT FOR KOLOMOGOROV CONDITIONALIZATION
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020323000345openalex-snapshot
NON-FACTIVE KOLMOGOROV CONDITIONALIZATION
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1004229808144openalex-snapshot
Auto-Epistemology and Updating
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The Coherence Argument Against Conditionalization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1014859910339openalex-snapshot
Testing Inference To The Best Explanation
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Conditioning against the Grain
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Beauty and the Bets
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Bayesian models of cognition revisited: Setting optimality aside and letting data drive psychological theory.
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Best, second-best, and good-enough explanations: How they matter to reasoning.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1123038openalex-snapshot
A defense of objectivism about evidential support
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1983.10477026openalex-snapshot
The Prevision of a Prevision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/02691720500512440openalex-snapshot
The Publicity of Belief, Epistemic Wrongs and Moral Wrongs
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Laws: Projectability and uniformity
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Explanation, updating, and accuracy
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Conditionalization and Expected Utility
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Is There a Dutch Book Argument for Probability Kinematics?
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Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics
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Discussion: A Mistake in Dynamic Coherence Arguments?
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Oracles, Aesthetics, and Bayesian Consensus
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Inference to the Best Explanation Made Coherent
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/432427openalex-snapshot
Radical Probabilism and Bayesian Conditioning*
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/518815openalex-snapshot
Diachronic Coherence and Radical Probabilism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/735532openalex-snapshot
Elimination Counterexamples: A Blow to Accuracy Monism?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1978.2.192482openalex-snapshot
Two Theories of Probability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.1.192756openalex-snapshot
Dutch Strategies for Diachronic Rules: When Believers See the Sure Loss Coming
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198238029.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind
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Simplicity as a Pragmatic Criterion for Deciding What Hypotheses to Take Seriously
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198238029.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Pragmatism and Reasons for Belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198238029.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Doubts About Conceptual Analysis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198238029.003.0010openalex-snapshot
Language, Thought, and Communication
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198238029.003.0013openalex-snapshot
(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198238029.003.0015openalex-snapshot
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
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Immanent and Transcendent Approaches to Meaning and Mind
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Ideal Science: David Lewis's Account of Laws1
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Necessity, Worlds, and Chance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198248601.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Universals: Laws Grounded in Nature
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198248601.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Inference to the Best Explanation: Salvation by Laws?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198248601.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Towards a New Epistemology
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What if There Are No Laws? a Manifesto
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198248601.003.0009openalex-snapshot
Introduction to the Semantic Approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198248601.003.0010openalex-snapshot
Symmetry Arguments in Science and Metaphysics
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Symmetries Guiding Modern Science1
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Indifference: The Symmetries of Probability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198248601.003.0013openalex-snapshot
Symmetries of Probability Kinematics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Hume's problem: induction and the justification of belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.003.0004openalex-snapshot
Realism and the No‐Miracles Argument
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.003.0009openalex-snapshot
The Logic of Scientific Discovery
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197793572.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Self-Assembly and Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197793572.003.0003openalex-snapshot
Generalized Signaling Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197793572.003.0004openalex-snapshot
Assembling Games from Decisions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197793572.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Rule Following and Template Transfer
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197793572.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Modular Composition and the Evolution of Salience
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197793572.003.0007openalex-snapshot
The Self-Assembly of Computation
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