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Remarks on some approaches to the concept of logical consequence

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9825-4openalex-snapshot
Essays on Mathematical and Philosophical Logic
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Proofs and the Meaning and Completeness of the Logical Constants
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On the idea of a general proof theory
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Untersuchungen �ber das logische Schlie�en. I
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Ideas and Results in Proof Theory
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The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic
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Proceedings of the Second Scandinavian Logic Symposium
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Towards A Foundation of A General Proof Theory
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Foundations of Intuitionistic Logic
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Constructive mathematics and computer programming
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Announcement
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Meaning and proofs: on the conflict between classical and intuitionistic logic
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Alfred Tarski. Über den Begriff der logischen Folgerung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, VII Logique, Actualités scientifiques et industrielles 394, Hermann & Cie, Paris1936, pp. 1–11.

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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Inferentialism
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Failures of Categoricity and Compositionality for Intuitionistic Disjunction
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Proof-theoretic Validity and the Completeness of Intuitionistic Logic
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On the Semantic Concept of Logical Consequence
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From Models to Evidence
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Motivations for an Internalist Semantics
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Varieties of Semantical Anti-realism
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Harmony and Paradox
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Assertion, Assumption, and Deduction
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Grounding Medieval Consequence
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Truth May Be Redundant
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Deductive Reasoning in Human Thinking: Some Remarks About Boethius’s Logical Project
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Prawitz, Proofs, and Meaning
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General-Elimination Harmony and Higher-Level Rules
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Advances in Proof-Theoretic Semantics
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Open Problems in Proof-Theoretic Semantics
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Inferentialism and Its Discontents
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Was ist „Bedeutung“?
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Dummett on a Theory of Meaning and Its Impact on Logic
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Logical consequence: A defense of Tarski
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Classical Harmony and Separability
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Somehow Things Do Not Relate: On the Interpretation of Polyadic Second-Order Logic
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Proofs, Grounds and Empty Functions: Epistemic Compulsion in Prawitz’s Semantics
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How logic(ian)s disagree
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General-Elimination Stability
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The Justification of the Logical Laws Revisited
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Validity Concepts in Proof-theoretic Semantics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9906-8openalex-snapshot
Assertion, inference, and consequence
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The original sin of proof-theoretic semantics
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Reflective equilibrium in logic
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Introduction: Inferences and Proofs
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Author index volume 86 (1991)
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A Note on Non-Monotonic Reasoning
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What is logic?
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Partial inductive definitions
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The Epistemology of Logic
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REREADING TARSKI ON LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE
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Proof and Canonical Proof
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Can sentential quantification tell us what truth is?
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Proof-Theoretic Validity
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Proof-theoretic semantics, paradoxes and the distinction between sense and denotation
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Compositionality, Understanding, and Proofs
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Neopragmatism and Logic
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Logical Consequence From a Constructivist View
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Gregory Lavers. Mathematics Is (Mostly) Analytic
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Bivalence: meaning theory vs metaphysics
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Proofs as Acts and Proofs as Objects: Some questions for Dag Prawitz*
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On the Copernican Turn in Semantics
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Model pluralism for logic
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Peano's Counterexample to Harmony
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A note on Etchemendy's and Prawitz's reduction principles for the Tarskian and model‐theoretic concept of consequence
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Pursuit of the concept of validity: A dialogue
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Validity of inferences and validity of demonstrations
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Proof-theoretic versus Model-theoretic Consequence
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More Reflections on Consequence
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Logical Consequence Revisited
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Uma investigação acerca das regras para a negação e o absurdo em dedução natural
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An Interactive Approach to Proof-Theoretic Semantics
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Le statut dynamique des axiomes : des preuves aux modèles
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