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On the idea of a general proof theory

https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00660889
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01201353openalex-snapshot
Untersuchungen �ber das logische Schlie�en. I
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01206605openalex-snapshot
Über das Unendliche
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0049-237x(08)70843-7openalex-snapshot
Une Extension De ĽInterpretation De Gödel a ĽAnalyse, Et Son Application a ĽElimination Des Coupures Dans ĽAnalyse Et La Theorie Des Types
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0049-237x(08)70849-8openalex-snapshot
Ideas and Results in Proof Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0049-237x(09)70361-1openalex-snapshot
Towards A Foundation of A General Proof Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0049-237x(09)70587-7openalex-snapshot
Foundations of Intuitionistic Logic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2183047openalex-snapshot
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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Against Harmony
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Inferentialism
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Semantical Games and Transcendental Arguments
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Antirealism and Falsity
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The adequacy problem for inferential logic
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A unifying theory of dependent types: the schematic approach
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Failure of Completeness in Proof-Theoretic Semantics
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Burali-Forti as a Purely Logical Paradox
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Reading Conclusions Conjunctively
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On the Relationship Between Logic’s Neutrality and Theory Closure
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Meaning Approached Via Proofs
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Validity Concepts in Proof-theoretic Semantics
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Radical anti-realism, Wittgenstein and the length of proofs
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Assertion, inference, and consequence
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Author index volume 86 (1991)
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Reprint of: A more general general proof theory
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Partial inductive definitions
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Classical First-Order Logic
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Sentential semantics
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BOLZANO’S CONCEPT OF GROUNDING (ABFOLGE) AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF NORMAL PROOFS
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WHAT IS A RULE OF INFERENCE?
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THE PROOF IS IN THE CHECKING
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Direct vs. Indirect Consequences of Empirical Verifications
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Quine and verificationism
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Logical Consequence and Natural Language
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New Essays on the Knowability Paradox
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Copyright Page
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Dedication
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List of Contributors
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Introduction
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Referee Reports on Fitch's “A Definition of Value”
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A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts
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Knowability Noir: 1945–1963
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Fitch's Paradox of Knowability
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The Paradox of Knowability and the Mapping Objection
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Truth, Indefinite Extensibility, and Fitch's Paradox
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Beyond the Limits of Knowledge
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Knowability and Possible Epistemic Oddities
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Actions That Make Us Know
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Can Truth Out?
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Logical Types in Some Arguments about Knowability and Belief
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Tennant's Troubles
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Restriction Strategies for Knowability: Some Lessons in False Hope
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Revamping the Restriction Strategy
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On Keeping Blue Swans and Unknowable Facts at Bay: A Case Study on Fitch's Paradox
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Fitch's Paradox and the Philosophy of Mathematics
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Performance and Paradox
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The Mystery of the Disappearing Diamond
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Invincible Ignorance
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Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch‐Style Reasoning
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Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at least, not all at once)
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Logical Pluralism
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Copyright Page
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Introduction
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Logical Consequence
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Pluralism Defined
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Classical Logic
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Relevant Logic
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Constructive Logic
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Variations & Loose Ends
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General Objections
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Specific Objections
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Other Directions
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A structural tonk
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Constructive semantics, admissibility of rules and the validity of Peirce's law
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A Proof-Theoretic Approach to Logic Programming
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A bilateral Hilbert-style investigation of 2-intuitionistic logic
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Compositionality, Understanding, and Proofs
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A New Unified Account of Truth and Paradox
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Reasoning with Attitude
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Copyright Page
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Dedication
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Preface
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List of Figures
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Expressivism
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Inferentialism
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Inferential Expressivism
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Epistemic Modals
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Moral Vocabulary
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Attitudes
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Truth
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Conditionals
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Probability
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The Road Ahead
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Inferentialism, Logicism, Harmony, and a Counterpoint
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Replies to Part III Logical Revisionism
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Logical Consequence From a Constructivist View
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A Logical Theory of Truth-Makers and Falsity-Makers
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Logic, Mathematics, and the A Priori, Part II: Core Logic as Analytic, and as the Basis for Natural Logicism
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Brouwer's Conception of Truth
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Logic, Mathematics, and the A Priori, Part II: Core Logic as Analytic, and as the Basis for Natural Logicism
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RULE-CIRCULARITY AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF DEDUCTION
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Proof and Paradox
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Conventional Necessity and the Contingency of Convention
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In defence of evolutionary epistemology
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Bivalence: meaning theory vs metaphysics
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Prawitz's completeness conjecture: A reassessment
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Validity of inferences and validity of demonstrations
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A Propositional Theory of Truth
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Inferentialism and Quantification
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Tonking a theory of content: an inferentialist rejoinder
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Existence Assumptions and Logical Principles : Choice Operators in Intuitionistic Logic
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The problem of justification in formal knowledge representation
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Meaning is Use: the Case of Propositional Identity
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More Reflections on Consequence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.21452/isbn.978-65-900390-1-9_lna_serie-a_v.2openalex-snapshot
About logic and logicians. Volume 1: Philosophy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.21452/isbn.978-65-900390-2-6_lna_serie-a_v.1openalex-snapshot
About logic and logicians. Volume 1: Philosophy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/2219964openalex-snapshot
Atomic Realism, Intuitionist Logic and Tarskian Truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.29007/1821openalex-snapshot
A System for Evaluating the Admissibility of Rules for Intuitionistic Propositional Logic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3390/math9212671openalex-snapshot
Schema Complexity in Propositional-Based Logics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4000/philosophiascientiae.965openalex-snapshot
A Critical Remark on the BHK Interpretation of Implication
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Logical Inferentialism & Attacks on Classical Logic
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The Formalization of Arguments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i2.03openalex-snapshot
Reflective Equilibrium on the Fringe
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