On the public citation graph
Representational of conditional probabilities
0 signed · 56 inferred · view as graph
Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.
Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the
claims that are yours.
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a
known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped
badge you can embed.
What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1438-0_13openalex-snapshot
A Semantic Analysis of Niels Bohr’s Philosophy of Quantum Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02024393openalex-snapshot
On a new axiomatic theory of probability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02024394openalex-snapshot
Sur la structure des espaces de probabilité conditionnelle
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3611503openalex-snapshot
Foundations of the Theory of Probability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412961288.n223openalex-snapshot
Logic of Scientific Discovery, The
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5474-7openalex-snapshot
Causation, Coherence, and Concepts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_12openalex-snapshot
Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-Beliefs and Disbeliefs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7759-0_10openalex-snapshot
Non-Monotonic Logic: Preferential Versus Algebraic Semantics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2865-7_5openalex-snapshot
Causation and the Dynamics of Belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2865-7_6openalex-snapshot
Ordinal Conditional Functions: A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_1openalex-snapshot
A Sketch of Some Recent Developments in the Theory of Conditionals
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7676-5_20openalex-snapshot
Deterministic and Probabilistic Reasons and Causes
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00137827openalex-snapshot
The dynamics of belief: Contractions and revisions of probability functions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00137831openalex-snapshot
The representation of Popper measures
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00249367openalex-snapshot
Analysis of quantum probability theory. I
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00293429openalex-snapshot
Probabilistic semantics objectified: I. postulates and logics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00296175openalex-snapshot
On probabilistic representation of non-probabilistic belief revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00413864openalex-snapshot
On the significance of conditional probabilities
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf02378821openalex-snapshot
Bayesian learning models with revision of evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9656-3openalex-snapshot
You Can’t Always Get What You Want Some Considerations Regarding Conditional Probabilities
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9176-4openalex-snapshot
Conditional Probability in the Light of Qualitative Belief Change
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-014-9317-7openalex-snapshot
Popper Functions, Uniform Distributions and Infinite Sequences of Heads
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-012-9284-0openalex-snapshot
Probabilistic Belief Contraction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9369-8openalex-snapshot
Probabilistic dynamic belief revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0458-6openalex-snapshot
Regular probability comparisons imply the Banach–Tarski Paradox
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1070-8openalex-snapshot
Conditioning using conditional expectations: the Borel–Kolmogorov Paradox
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02231-8openalex-snapshot
Dynamic and stochastic systems as a framework for metaphysics and the philosophy of science
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02954-zopenalex-snapshot
On the imprecision of full conditional probabilities
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-025-05177-2openalex-snapshot
The impossibility of generating comparative probabilities from primitive conditional probabilities
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-1-4832-1453-5.50007-6openalex-snapshot
A Knowledge-Based Framework for Belief Change Part I: Foundations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.013openalex-snapshot
Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.01.001openalex-snapshot
Preference-based belief operators
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009401319openalex-snapshot
The Measurement of Subjective Probability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300009318openalex-snapshot
Full Belief and Probability: Comments on Van Fraassen
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020311000153openalex-snapshot
A PROBABILISTIC SEMANTICS FOR COUNTERFACTUALS. PART A
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020311000165openalex-snapshot
A PROBABILISTIC SEMANTICS FOR COUNTERFACTUALS. PART B
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020318000060openalex-snapshot
TRIANGULATING NON-ARCHIMEDEAN PROBABILITY
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1004229808144openalex-snapshot
Auto-Epistemology and Updating
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005082908147openalex-snapshot
The Coherence Argument Against Conditionalization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1012277218013openalex-snapshot
Iterative Probability Kinematics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/b:synt.0000004904.91112.16openalex-snapshot
What Conditional Probability Could Not Be
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2021.2003670openalex-snapshot
‘A Formula Which I Derived Many Years Ago’ Boole, Reichenbach and Popper on Probability and Conditionals
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/392778openalex-snapshot
A Characterization of Imaging in Terms of Popper Functions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1976.2.192397openalex-snapshot
Rational Conceptual Change
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad099openalex-snapshot
Primitive conditional probabilities, subset relations and comparative regularity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199976119.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Belief and Counterfactuals
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/1324249.1324260openalex-snapshot
From conditional probability to the logic of doxastic actions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1040308833openalex-snapshot
On the Revision of Probabilistic Belief States
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.18778/0138-0680.2021.04openalex-snapshot
Common Knowledge, Common Attitudes and Social Reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/2273129openalex-snapshot
On carnap and popper probability functions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4288/jafpos1956.13.105openalex-snapshot
The Old Evidence Problem and AGM Theory
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity
Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers
publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free
and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.