On the public citation graph
On probabilistic representation of non-probabilistic belief revision
0 signed · 50 inferred · view as graph
Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.
Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the
claims that are yours.
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a
known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped
badge you can embed.
What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_6openalex-snapshot
Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00137827openalex-snapshot
The dynamics of belief: Contractions and revisions of probability functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00370643openalex-snapshot
Variations on the Ramsey test: More triviality results
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00649400openalex-snapshot
Representational of conditional probabilities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00869410openalex-snapshot
How to give it up: A survey of some formal aspects of the logic of theory change
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1980.10715741openalex-snapshot
Brain Ellis Rational Belief Systems. APQ Library of Philosophy, Blackwell; Oxford, 1979, ix + 118 pp.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/289091openalex-snapshot
Conditional Probabilities and Probabilities Given Knowledge of a Condition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1982.tb00480.xopenalex-snapshot
On the logic of theory change: Contraction functions and their associated revision functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1989.tb00725.xopenalex-snapshot
New operators for theory change
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2185133openalex-snapshot
Belief Revisions and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2274239openalex-snapshot
On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315887814openalex-snapshot
Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_7openalex-snapshot
Belief Revision from an Epistemological Point of View
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13560-1_55openalex-snapshot
Probabilistic Belief Revision via Imaging
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9609-8_11openalex-snapshot
Functional vs. Relational Approaches to Belief Revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5054-5_2openalex-snapshot
Revision of Belief Sets and Belief Bases
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5054-5_4openalex-snapshot
Conditionals and the Ramsey Test
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8311-4_5openalex-snapshot
How to Model Relational Belief Revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00284974openalex-snapshot
Theory contraction through base contraction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00413567openalex-snapshot
Belief revision, epistemic conditionals and the Ramsey test
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00413864openalex-snapshot
On the significance of conditional probabilities
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bfb0018418openalex-snapshot
Epistemic entrenchment with incomparabilities and relational belief revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00864-xopenalex-snapshot
Combining Probabilities with Full Beliefs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10849-023-09402-4openalex-snapshot
Iterated AGM Revision Based on Probability Revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-006-9027-xopenalex-snapshot
New Foundations for a Relational Theory of Theory-revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9176-4openalex-snapshot
Conditional Probability in the Light of Qualitative Belief Change
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-023-09716-5openalex-snapshot
A Basis for AGM Revision in Bayesian Probability Revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-008-9126-2openalex-snapshot
Decision Theory, Intelligent Planning and Counterfactuals
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-012-9284-0openalex-snapshot
Probabilistic Belief Contraction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-005-8475-6openalex-snapshot
Contracting Intuitionistic Theories
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-021-09973-yopenalex-snapshot
A Semantics for Hyperintensional Belief Revision Based on Information Bases
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(94)90095-7openalex-snapshot
Unifying default reasoning and belief revision in a modal framework
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2011.09.008openalex-snapshot
Revising beliefs on the basis of evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2015.01.003openalex-snapshot
A belief revision framework for revising epistemic states with partial epistemic states
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005577906029openalex-snapshot
Ddl Unlimited: Dynamic Doxastic Logic for Introspective Agents
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1021227106744openalex-snapshot
Can Bayes' Rule be Justified by Cognitive Rationality Principles?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/392865openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Confirmation of Theories That Incorporate Idealizations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exag007openalex-snapshot
Belief change based on knowledge measures
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exu034openalex-snapshot
Epistemic extensions of modal distributive substructural logics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/wi.2016.0013openalex-snapshot
Using Belief Change Principles for Evolving Bayesian Network Structures in Probabilistic Knowledge Representations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1992.tb01138.xopenalex-snapshot
The Ramsey test revisited*
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1999.tb00110.xopenalex-snapshot
Cooperation in Philosophy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1040308833openalex-snapshot
On the Revision of Probabilistic Belief States
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7585openalex-snapshot
A Belief Revision Framework for Revising Epistemic States with Partial Epistemic States
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/190openalex-snapshot
A Unifying Framework for Probabilistic Belief Revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3233/fi-1997-32206openalex-snapshot
Proposal for a Theory of Belief Revision Along the Lines of Lindström and Rabinowicz
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity
Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers
publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free
and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.