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A theory of forward induction in finitely repeated games

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-96978-2openalex-snapshot

Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00134105openalex-snapshot

Self enforceable paths in extensive form games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90038-0openalex-snapshot

Stable equilibria and forward induction

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90083-vopenalex-snapshot

Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90122-kopenalex-snapshot

Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90003-1openalex-snapshot

Cooperation and bounded recall

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90023-8openalex-snapshot

Forward induction and sunk costs give average cost pricing

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90029-eopenalex-snapshot

Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139173759openalex-snapshot

The Theory of Social Situations

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/135684openalex-snapshot

Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912320openalex-snapshot

On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912660openalex-snapshot

Finitely Repeated Games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912767openalex-snapshot

Sequential Equilibria

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913771openalex-snapshot

Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2938166openalex-snapshot

Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory

What points at this work

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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.308766openalex-extracted

Strategic Delegation by Unobservable Incentive Contracts

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/j.1662-6370.1999.tb00268.xopenalex-snapshot

Reziproker Interessenausgleich in internationalen Verhandlungssystemen und Konkordanzdemokratien

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-95183-0_6openalex-snapshot

Interessenausgleich durch Reziprozität, Vorwärtsinduktion und Zwei-Ebenen-Spiele

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.004openalex-snapshot

Forward induction equilibrium

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00289openalex-snapshot

Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts

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