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Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria

https://doi.org/10.2307/135684
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On Exiting After Voting
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0206-8openalex-snapshot
Equilibrium with strategy-dependent trembles
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0033-6openalex-snapshot
On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0049-yopenalex-snapshot
On participation games with complete information
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0053-2openalex-snapshot
Approval voting: three examples
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0063-0openalex-snapshot
Essential stability in games with infinitely many pure strategies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0073-6openalex-snapshot
A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0095-0openalex-snapshot
The computational complexity of evolutionarily stable strategies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0161-xopenalex-snapshot
Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0306-6openalex-snapshot
A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0424-zopenalex-snapshot
The Re fined Best-Response Correspondence in Normal Form Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0575-9openalex-snapshot
Tempered best response dynamics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050050openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Stability in Symmetric Extensive Form Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050095openalex-snapshot
The Folk theorem for dominance solutions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200096openalex-snapshot
Best response dynamics for role games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200098openalex-snapshot
Maximal stable sets of two-player games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300136openalex-snapshot
Evolutionary insights on the willingness to communicate
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300138openalex-snapshot
Control costs and potential functions for spatial games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400167openalex-snapshot
Symmetry and p -Stability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400174openalex-snapshot
Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-008-0279-9openalex-snapshot
Opportune moment strategies for a cost spanning tree game
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