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Evolution of cooperation by reciprocation within structured demes
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
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Evolution and the Theory of Games
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The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts
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An evolutionarily stable strategy model for randomly mating diploid populations
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Evolution of social behavior by reciprocation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-5193(80)80031-2openalex-snapshot
On evolutionarily stable compositions of populations of interacting genotypes
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A quantitative genetic model of two-policy games between relatives
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Evolution and the Theory of Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.80.13.4065openalex-snapshot
A quantitative genetic model of reciprocal altruism: a condition for kin or group selection to prevail.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/284479openalex-snapshot
The Evolution of Helping Behavior in Large, Randomly Mixed Populations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1126/science.227.4692.1363openalex-snapshot
Mutual Restraint in Tree Swallows: A Test of the TIT FOR TAT Model of Reciprocity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.es.14.110183.002113openalex-snapshot
Game Theory in the Ecological Context
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2174952openalex-snapshot
The Natural Selection of Populations and Communities.
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
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Agent-Based Modelling: A Bridge Between Psychology and Macro-social Science
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Complexity of Behavioural Strategies and Cooperation in the Optional Public Goods Game
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How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence
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Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance
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Culture, evolution and the puzzle of human cooperation
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Hunter–Gatherer population structure and the evolution of contingent cooperation
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Direct reciprocity under uncertainty does not explain one-shot cooperation, but demonstrates the benefits of a norm psychology
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Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity
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Three-person game facilitates indirect reciprocity under image scoring
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Chaos, oscillation and the evolution of indirect reciprocity in n-person games
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Revisiting “The Evolution of Reciprocity in Sizable Groups”: Continuous reciprocity in the repeated n-person prisoner's dilemma
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Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation
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Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games
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Evolution of group-wise cooperation: Is direct reciprocity insufficient?
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Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option
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Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present
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Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity
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Payoff non-linearity sways the effect of mistakes on the evolution of reciprocity
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Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators
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Cooperation in the spatial public goods game with the second-order reputation evaluation
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The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
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Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups
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Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
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Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent
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Evolution of spite versus evolution of altruism through a disbandment mechanism
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Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
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Models of decision-making and the coevolution of social preferences
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Evolution of altruistic punishments among heterogeneous conditional cooperators
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Optimal strategies and cost-benefit analysis of the $${\varvec{n}}$$-player weightlifting game
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Reputation preferences resolve social dilemmas in spatial multigames
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Subduing always defecting mutants by multiplayer reactive strategies: non-reciprocity versus generosity
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Evolution of conditional cooperation in public good games
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Emergence of cooperation in public goods games
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Evolution of culture-dependent discriminate sociality: a gene–culture coevolutionary model
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A simple rule for the evolution of contingent cooperation in large groups
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Direct Reciprocity Under Uncertainty Does Not Explain One-Shot Cooperation, But It Can Explain Norm Psychology
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How to make a kin selection model when marginal fitness is non-linear?
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The evolution of cooperation under local regulation and non-additive gene action: building on Hamilton’s ideas
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Amplitude death in coupled replicator map lattice: Averting migration dilemma
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Effects of Iterated Interactions in Multiplayer Spatial Evolutionary Games
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When is bigger better? T he effects of group size on the evolution of helping behaviours
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Should You Really Produce What Consumers Like Online? Empirical Evidence for Reciprocal Voting in Open Innovation Contests
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Cooperation, Punishment, and the Evolution of Human Institutions
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The Further Evolution of Cooperation
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EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS ON SPATIAL LOCALITY IN N-PERSON ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA
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Modelos matemáticos para evolução social: de cooperação à diversidade linguística
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On the Usefulness of Memory Skills in Social Interactions
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Reciprocal Strategies for Large Groups
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Reinforcement Learning Explains Conditional Cooperation and Its Moody Cousin
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Altruism Can Proliferate through Population Viscosity despite High Random Gene Flow
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Can Self-interest Explain Cooperation?
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Cooperación humana, reciprocidad y castigo. Un enfoque evolutivo
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Evolution of Groupwise Cooperation: Generosity, Paradoxical Behavior, and Non-Linear Payoff Functions
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Coevolution of cooperation, causal cognition and mindreading
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Culture and the Evolution of the Human Social Instincts
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Two-level Fisher-Wright framework with selection and migration: An approach to studying evolution in group structured populations
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Invasion, polymorphic equilibria and fixation of a mutant social allele in group structured populations
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Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games
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Behavioral Mistakes Support Cooperation in an N-Person Repeated Public Goods Game
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Evolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemma—Dynamical Systems Game Approach
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