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Direct Reciprocity Under Uncertainty Does Not Explain One-Shot Cooperation, But It Can Explain Norm Psychology
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119125563.evpsych236openalex-snapshot
The False Allure of Group Selection
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.1994.1092openalex-snapshot
No Strategy is Evolutionarily Stable in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02934456openalex-snapshot
Evolution of cooperation by reciprocation within structured demes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-008-0064-1openalex-snapshot
The Resurrection of Group Selection as a Theory of Human Cooperation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90002-4openalex-snapshot
Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90021-9openalex-snapshot
Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(89)90027-0openalex-snapshot
Evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-yopenalex-snapshot
Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(95)00052-6openalex-snapshot
The coevolution of automata in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2011.03.003openalex-snapshot
Culture–gene coevolution, norm-psychology and the emergence of human prosociality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2005.09.005openalex-snapshot
Game theory and human evolution: A critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-5193(05)80113-4openalex-snapshot
Group selection among alternative evolutionarily stable strategies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-5193(88)80219-4openalex-snapshot
The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-5193(89)80146-8openalex-snapshot
Oscillations in the evolution of reciprocity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00094-5openalex-snapshot
Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00026479openalex-snapshot
Gaps in Harley's argument on evolutionarily stable learning rules and in the logic of “tit for tat”
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00026509openalex-snapshot
When does game theory model reality?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x05000142openalex-snapshot
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x12001513openalex-snapshot
Putting revenge and forgiveness in an evolutionary context
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1038/327058a0openalex-snapshot
No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1102131108openalex-snapshot
Evolution of direct reciprocity under uncertainty can explain human generosity in one-shot encounters
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1115225108openalex-snapshot
Flexible strategies, forgiveness, and the evolution of generosity in one-shot encounters
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/0199262055.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Foundations of Human Sociality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.2723openalex-snapshot
Do humansreallypunish altruistically? A closer look
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2009.0134openalex-snapshot
Culture and the evolution of human cooperation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1420-9101.2006.01159.xopenalex-snapshot
Reciprocity: you have to think different
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556151openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.1.166openalex-snapshot
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0045662openalex-snapshot
What Are Punishment and Reputation for?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2005-0107openalex-snapshot
The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1537/ase1887.22.495openalex-snapshot
The descent of man and selection in relation to sex
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911307openalex-snapshot
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-004465783openalex-snapshot
Is strong reciprocity a maladaptation?: on the evolutionary foundations of human altruism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4161/cib.3.2.10528openalex-snapshot
Why cultural and genetic group selection are unequal partners in the evolution of human behavior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5962/bhl.title.2095openalex-snapshot
The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex / by Charles Darwin.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/3232.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism
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