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Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0358-4
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1069openalex-snapshot
Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03750-8openalex-snapshot
Current Trends in Economics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03750-8_2openalex-snapshot
Degree of manipulability of social choice procedures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00125915openalex-snapshot
Susceptibility to manipulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00128122openalex-snapshot
On strategy-proofness and single peakedness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02400947openalex-snapshot
Statistical manipulability of social choice functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0198-4openalex-snapshot
A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0170-9openalex-snapshot
One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0285-8openalex-snapshot
Dictatorial domains
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0603-4openalex-snapshot
Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050166openalex-snapshot
Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100113openalex-snapshot
On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200065openalex-snapshot
Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200073openalex-snapshot
Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90020-8openalex-snapshot
Single-peaked orders on a tree
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/256633openalex-snapshot
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00349.xopenalex-snapshot
Strategy‐Proofness and the Tops‐Only Property
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2008.6.5.949openalex-snapshot
On The Robustness of Majority Rule
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1909947openalex-snapshot
A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1914083openalex-snapshot
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2938220openalex-snapshot
Voting by Committees

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1824931openalex-extracted
A Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof and No-Vetoer Rules in the Multi-Object Choice Model
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3288244openalex-extracted
Collective Choice Rules on Convex Restricted Domains
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-0742-7_4openalex-snapshot
Strategy-Proof Location Functions on Finite Graphs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0378-6openalex-snapshot
A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0695-1openalex-snapshot
The Welfare Effects of Pre-Arrangements in Matching Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0930-7openalex-snapshot
Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01353-wopenalex-snapshot
Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0286-4openalex-snapshot
Nash Implementable Domains for the Borda Count
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0654-6openalex-snapshot
Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01382-3openalex-snapshot
Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01399-2openalex-snapshot
Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01553-yopenalex-snapshot
Plurality rule and Condorcet criterion over restricted domains
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00258-3openalex-snapshot
On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality kth rules
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9261-8openalex-snapshot
Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.07.016openalex-snapshot
Nash implementability of the plurality rule over restricted domains
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.02.013openalex-snapshot
Monotonicity and robustness of majority rule
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.006openalex-snapshot
Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110164openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12198openalex-snapshot
A Strategy‐Proofness Characterization of Plurality Rule
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.15476/elte.2019.233openalex-snapshot
The mathematical analysis of voting and districting rules
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-10837openalex-snapshot
Voting when Rankings Matter: Truthful Equilibria, Efficiency, and Abstention
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.26481/dis.20190315skopenalex-snapshot
On stability in matching and strategy-proofness in social choice
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