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The Welfare Effects of Pre-Arrangements in Matching Markets

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0695-1
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2316openalex-snapshot
Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2507openalex-snapshot
Can Pre-arranged Matches Be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0358-4openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0366-4openalex-snapshot
Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0569-3openalex-snapshot
The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0618-6openalex-snapshot
On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0097-zopenalex-snapshot
Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-intern Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0139-6openalex-snapshot
Mixed Strategies in Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital–Intern Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90106-1openalex-snapshot
The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-218x(85)90074-5openalex-snapshot
Some remarks on the stable matching problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.009openalex-snapshot
Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2005.02.002openalex-snapshot
The dynamics of law clerk matching: An experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.09.002openalex-snapshot
Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/ccol052139015xopenalex-snapshot
Two-Sided Matching
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827openalex-snapshot
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/317675openalex-snapshot
Risk Sharing, Sorting, and Early Contracting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1126/science.2274783openalex-snapshot
New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in Market Organization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282805774669637openalex-snapshot
The Boston Public School Match
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282805774669989openalex-snapshot
A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282805774670167openalex-snapshot
The New York City High School Match
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.5.2125openalex-snapshot
Early Admissions at Selective Colleges
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.4.748openalex-snapshot
The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.3.608openalex-snapshot
Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.4.617openalex-snapshot
The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1285331openalex-snapshot
Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1600403openalex-snapshot
The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2312726openalex-snapshot
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2601031openalex-snapshot
A Competitive Theory of Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Unravelling in Two- Sided Matching
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w13213openalex-snapshot
The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2927361openalex-extracted
Pre-Exchange-Proof House Allocation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3160802openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_4openalex-snapshot
The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0704-4openalex-snapshot
An analysis of the German university admissions system
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0804-4openalex-snapshot
Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.022openalex-snapshot
Incompatibility between stability and consistency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.004openalex-snapshot
Endowments-Swapping-Proof House Allocation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.08.006openalex-snapshot
Application fee manipulations in matching markets
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