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Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0024openalex-snapshot
Nash Implementation of Matching Rules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2586openalex-snapshot
Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00179982openalex-snapshot
The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213799openalex-snapshot
Implementation of college admission rules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100152openalex-snapshot
A crash course in implementation theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050024openalex-snapshot
Monotonic extensions on economic domains
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90106-1openalex-snapshot
The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0openalex-snapshot
On cores and indivisibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90051-sopenalex-snapshot
On nash implementation of social choice correspondences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.03.007openalex-snapshot
Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00096-6openalex-snapshot
Stable schedule matching under revealed preference
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00107-8openalex-snapshot
Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(96)00758-6openalex-snapshot
Implementation in generalized matching problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0110(02)80009-1openalex-snapshot
Chapter 5 Implementation theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511813825openalex-snapshot
Putting Auction Theory to Work
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/ccol052139015xopenalex-snapshot
Two-Sided Matching
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827openalex-snapshot
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261272openalex-snapshot
The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00076openalex-snapshot
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054825466openalex-snapshot
Matching with Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.3.1189openalex-snapshot
Matching with Contracts: Comment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.4.617openalex-snapshot
The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1273622openalex-snapshot
Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911460openalex-snapshot
Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913392openalex-snapshot
Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913838openalex-snapshot
Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2554894openalex-snapshot
Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2938301openalex-snapshot
Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.26481/umamet.2006059openalex-snapshot
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7249/r1056-1openalex-snapshot
On Cores and Indivisibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7907/c57yy-fm360openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1235462openalex-extracted
Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1273622openalex-extracted
Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2917189openalex-extracted
Take-it-or-Leave-it Contracts in Many-to-Many Matching Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0163-8openalex-snapshot
Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0704-4openalex-snapshot
An analysis of the German university admissions system
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01417-5openalex-snapshot
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0439-8openalex-snapshot
An impossibility theorem for matching problems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0105-8openalex-snapshot
A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2openalex-snapshot
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hesmat.2025.10.005openalex-snapshot
The theory of matching with contracts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.002openalex-snapshot
Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.03.007openalex-snapshot
Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.11.002openalex-snapshot
Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102517openalex-snapshot
Nash implementation in a many-to-one matching market
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054825466openalex-snapshot
Matching with Contracts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150035openalex-snapshot
Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5369037openalex-snapshot
The Theory of Matching with Contracts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5384365openalex-snapshot
Nash Implementation in a Many-to-One Matching Market
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