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Nash Implementation in a Many-to-One Matching Market

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5384365
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0743openalex-snapshot
Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0024openalex-snapshot
Nash Implementation of Matching Rules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0050openalex-snapshot
Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213799openalex-snapshot
Implementation of college admission rules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0115-8openalex-snapshot
The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0278-6openalex-snapshot
A further note on the college admission game
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400189openalex-snapshot
On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8openalex-snapshot
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0287-3openalex-snapshot
Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90106-1openalex-snapshot
The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90129-ropenalex-snapshot
Comparative statics in matching markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90051-sopenalex-snapshot
On nash implementation of social choice correspondences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.02.002openalex-snapshot
Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00107-8openalex-snapshot
Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/ccol052139015xopenalex-snapshot
Two-Sided Matching
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827openalex-snapshot
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1981.11995301openalex-snapshot
Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261272openalex-snapshot
The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/tac.1981.1102777openalex-snapshot
General theory of best variants choice: Some aspects
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00076openalex-snapshot
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.13.4.619openalex-snapshot
The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.4.617openalex-snapshot
The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2661961openalex-snapshot
Strategic Schools Under the Boston Mechanism Revisited
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913392openalex-snapshot
Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2938301openalex-snapshot
Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2210.06549openalex-snapshot
General Manipulability Theorem for a Matching Model
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