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On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1079openalex-snapshot
Bayesian and Weakly Robust First Best Mechanisms: Characterizations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03750-8_10openalex-snapshot
Ex post individually rational trading mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004107openalex-snapshot
Mechanism design in queueing problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0198-xopenalex-snapshot
When queueing is better than push and shove
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0409-9openalex-snapshot
Dissolving a partnership (un)fairly
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0104-8openalex-snapshot
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0180-9openalex-snapshot
Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0540-3openalex-snapshot
On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050227openalex-snapshot
The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050251openalex-snapshot
Payoff equivalence between Bayesian and ex post individually rational dominant strategy mechanisms ★
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050286openalex-snapshot
A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0610-xopenalex-snapshot
Partnership dissolution and proprietary information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0openalex-snapshot
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90126-9openalex-snapshot
Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90058-copenalex-snapshot
Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90145-topenalex-snapshot
Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2009.07.001openalex-snapshot
Bilateral trade with apositional traders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00021-6openalex-snapshot
Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00317openalex-snapshot
Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00546.xopenalex-snapshot
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00770.xopenalex-snapshot
A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00001.xopenalex-snapshot
Partnership dissolution with interdependent values
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00009.xopenalex-snapshot
Efficient partnership dissolution under buy-sell clauses
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.2.137openalex-snapshot
On Quitting Rights in Mechanism Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.1.1.182openalex-snapshot
Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1124076openalex-snapshot
When Queueing is Better than Push and Shove
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1322066openalex-snapshot
Minimizing Regret When Dissolving a Partnership
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.389541openalex-snapshot
Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911240openalex-snapshot
Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913096openalex-snapshot
Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951601openalex-snapshot
Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1687144openalex-extracted
Incentive Compatible Market Design with Applications
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1957429openalex-extracted
The k+1-Price Auction with Asymmetric Shares
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3939829openalex-extracted
Partnership Dissolution with Cash-Constrained Agents
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0444-8openalex-snapshot
Incentive compatible market design with applications
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0610-xopenalex-snapshot
Partnership dissolution and proprietary information
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0154-xopenalex-snapshot
Speculative Partnership Dissolution with Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-025-06640-6openalex-snapshot
Two player bargaining model with outside subsidy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-020-09746-2openalex-snapshot
The “Italian Football Federation Auction” for Co-ownership Resolution
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.014openalex-snapshot
Bilateral k + 1 -price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102714openalex-snapshot
Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: Comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.08.003openalex-snapshot
A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.08.003openalex-snapshot
Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12328openalex-snapshot
VALUE OF THE STATUS QUO AND EFFICIENT PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00160.xopenalex-snapshot
Bidding off the wall in common value auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2743openalex-snapshot
Contract Design by Service Providers with Private Effort
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.70675/27d5ea70z59c5z4e77z8498z869193ea0f6dopenalex-snapshot
Essays on Asymmetric Information and Regulation
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