On the public citation graph

Mixed Strategies in Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital–Intern Markets

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0139-6
0 signed · 36 inferred · view as graph

Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the claims that are yours.
Claim with ORCID
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped badge you can embed.
See reference health

What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2316openalex-snapshot
Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2507openalex-snapshot
Can Pre-arranged Matches Be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0097-zopenalex-snapshot
Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-intern Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90152-2openalex-snapshot
Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90106-1openalex-snapshot
The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511528231.007openalex-snapshot
Non-cooperative games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/ccol052139015xopenalex-snapshot
Two-Sided Matching
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827openalex-snapshot
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261272openalex-snapshot
The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282805774670167openalex-snapshot
The New York City High School Match
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.4.748openalex-snapshot
The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1969529openalex-snapshot
Non-Cooperative Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2554894openalex-snapshot
Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2274730openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2490451openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2667708openalex-extracted
When Manipulations Are Harm[less]ful?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3616356openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3616411openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4051256openalex-extracted
School Choice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0618-6openalex-snapshot
On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0695-1openalex-snapshot
The Welfare Effects of Pre-Arrangements in Matching Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0804-4openalex-snapshot
Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0364-2openalex-snapshot
Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0813-zopenalex-snapshot
Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hesedu.2022.11.001openalex-snapshot
School choice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.006openalex-snapshot
Manipulation via capacities revisited
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.009openalex-snapshot
Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.005openalex-snapshot
Optimal Truncation in Matching Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.08.006openalex-snapshot
Application fee manipulations in matching markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.02.002openalex-snapshot
Enrollment Manipulations in School Choice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.04.005openalex-snapshot
When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/733046openalex-snapshot
Strategic Wage Posting, Market Power, and Mismatch
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00064.xopenalex-snapshot
Endogenous preferential treatment in centralized admissions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993627openalex-snapshot
The college admissions problem with a continuum of students
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1257/000282805774670167openalex-snapshot
The New York City High School Match
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.3.608openalex-snapshot
Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.