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The role of critical mass in establishing a successful network market: An experimental investigation

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2015.08.001

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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Adaptive Learning and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Coordination Games: An ARCH(1) Approach

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0800openalex-snapshot

Minimum-Effort Coordination Games: Stochastic Potential and Logit Equilibrium

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z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments

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When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory

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On the adoption of innovations with ‘network’ externalities

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(96)01015-6openalex-snapshot

The economics of networks

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-404681-8.00016-9openalex-snapshot

Solving Coordination Problems Experimentally

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.05.038openalex-snapshot

Precedent transfer in coordination games: An experiment

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.06.003openalex-snapshot

Identifying critical mass in the global cellular telephony market

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2012.03.001openalex-snapshot

Technology adoption in markets with network effects: Theory and experimental evidence

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.12.029openalex-snapshot

The effect of hysteresis on equilibrium selection in coordination games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014openalex-snapshot

Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1024252725591openalex-snapshot

Coordination and Information in Critical Mass Games: An Experimental Study

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/b:reio.0000031367.79009.9bopenalex-snapshot

Experimental Evidence on Product Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/467198openalex-snapshot

The Fable of the Keys

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00512.xopenalex-snapshot

Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02207.xopenalex-snapshot

Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter‐Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/0034653043125275openalex-snapshot

Quantitative Analysis of Network Externalities in Competing Technologies: The VCR Case

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/009430610803700653openalex-snapshot

Laboratory Experiments in the Social Sciences

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Managing Growth to Achieve Efficient Coordination in Large Groups

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.3.669openalex-snapshot

A Change Would Do You Good .... An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations

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Technology Adoption in Critical Mass Games: Theory and Experimental Evidence

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2202/1446-9022.1206openalex-snapshot

Credibility, Pre-Production and Inviting Competition in a Network Market

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Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2937932openalex-snapshot

Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951699openalex-snapshot

Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003567openalex-snapshot

Critical Mass and Tariff Structure in Electronic Communications Markets

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203811191-11openalex-snapshot

Critical Mass and Network Evolution in Telecommunications

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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Fostering Cooperation Through Continuous Time Experience in Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

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Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects

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Overcoming coordination failure in a critical mass game: Strategic motives and action disclosure

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An experimental test of the global-game selection in coordination games with asymmetric players

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Coordination in a two-sided market entry game with endogenous capacity: an experimental investigation

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Making sense of the metaverse: the role of functional and interpretive engagement

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Coordination Behavior in Mode Choice: Laboratory Study of Equilibrium Transformation and Selection

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Ignorance is bliss? Information and risk on crowdfunding platforms

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.70675/192bd780ze7d0z42cdz9eb6zb5103f615a9aopenalex-snapshot

The Economics of Crowdfunding : Entrepreneurs’ and Platforms’ Strategies

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