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Fostering Cooperation Through Continuous Time Experience in Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4649794
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Increasing Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemmas by Establishing a Precedent of Efficiency in Coordination Games
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Behavioral spillovers in coordination games
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The effect of hysteresis on equilibrium selection in coordination games
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Taking turns in continuous time
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Building rational cooperation
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Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
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The role of critical mass in establishing a successful network market: An experimental investigation
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Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjx033openalex-extracted
Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdt023openalex-extracted
Cycles and Instability in a Rock-Paper-Scissors Population Game: A Continuous Time Experiment
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COOPERATION SPILLOVERS AND PRICE COMPETITION IN EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS
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Extension of the Rank Sum Test for Clustered Data: Two‐Group Comparisons with Group Membership Defined at the Subunit Level
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Building rational cooperation on their own: Learning to start small
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Rank-Sum Tests for Clustered Data
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Managing Growth to Achieve Efficient Coordination in Large Groups
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A Continuous Dilemma
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A Change Would Do You Good .... An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations
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On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey
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Habits of Virtue: Creating Norms of Cooperation and Defection in the Laboratory
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One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?
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Normative Conflict and History Dependence in Repeated Coordination Games
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Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
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Continuous Time Repeated Games
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Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
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