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What Cognitive Representations Support Primate Theory of Mind?

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/anbe.1999.1377openalex-snapshot
Chimpanzees know what conspecifics do and do not see
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/anbe.2000.1518openalex-snapshot
Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-015-0875-zopenalex-snapshot
Chimpanzees strategically manipulate what others can see
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5openalex-snapshot
Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(91)90040-bopenalex-snapshot
Children's early understanding of false belief
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2005.10.007openalex-snapshot
Rhesus monkeys, Macaca mulatta, know what others can and cannot hear
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2011.10.026openalex-snapshot
Bonobos and chimpanzees infer the target of another’s attention
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2013.04.021openalex-snapshot
Humans are not alone in computing how others see the world
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2015.04.028openalex-snapshot
The goggles experiment: can chimpanzees use self-experience to infer what a competitor can see?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2005.01.011openalex-snapshot
Chimpanzees deceive a human competitor by hiding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.08.010openalex-snapshot
Chimpanzees know what others know, but not what they believe
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.05.006openalex-snapshot
Eighteen-month-old infants show false belief understanding in an active helping paradigm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2011.07.011openalex-snapshot
Do 10-month-old infants understand others’ false beliefs?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.11.016openalex-snapshot
The origins of belief representation: Monkeys fail to automatically represent others’ beliefs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.05.016openalex-snapshot
Task instructions and implicit theory of mind
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2010.09.001openalex-snapshot
Attributing false beliefs about non-obvious properties at 18 months
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2004.12.076openalex-snapshot
Rhesus Monkeys Attribute Perceptions to Others
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2007.08.033openalex-snapshot
The Evolutionary Origins of Human Patience: Temporal Preferences in Chimpanzees, Bonobos, and Human Adults
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2015.08.004openalex-snapshot
Great Apes Make Anticipatory Looks Based on Long-Term Memory of Single Events
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2014.04.001openalex-snapshot
To belief or not belief: Children’s theory of mind
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2013.10.002openalex-snapshot
Eighteen-month-olds understand false beliefs in an unexpected-contents task
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.10.001openalex-snapshot
Core mechanisms in ‘theory of mind’
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.08.002openalex-snapshot
Developmental parallels in understanding minds and bodies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.010openalex-snapshot
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2009.12.006openalex-snapshot
False-belief understanding in infants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.08.004openalex-snapshot
From infants’ to children's appreciation of belief
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0010-0277(03)00064-7openalex-snapshot
Limits on theory of mind use in adults
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01362-5openalex-snapshot
Development of theory of mind and executive control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00049682openalex-snapshot
Tactical deception in primates
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00076512openalex-snapshot
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x05000129openalex-snapshot
Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295x.94.4.412openalex-snapshot
Pretense and representation: The origins of "theory of mind."
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037//0097-7403.21.1.82openalex-snapshot
Responses to quantity: Perceptual versus cognitive mechanisms in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).
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The Principles of Conventionality and Contrast in Word Learning: An Empirical Examination.
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Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) conceal visual and auditory information from others.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/a0013774openalex-snapshot
Infants' reasoning about others' false perceptions.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016923openalex-snapshot
Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1000469108openalex-snapshot
Chimpanzees know that others make inferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195326598.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Primate Social Cognition: Thirty Years After Premack and Woodruff
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Understanding Other Minds
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Agency and Joint Attention
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On the lack of evidence that non-human animals possess anything remotely resembling a ‘theory of mind’
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00028openalex-snapshot
A Nonverbal False Belief Task: The Performance of Children and Great Apes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00304openalex-snapshot
Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The Truth about False Belief
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.03436openalex-snapshot
Children Are Cursed
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A competitive nonverbal false belief task for children and apes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00946.xopenalex-snapshot
Seventeen‐month‐olds appeal to false beliefs to interpret others’ referential communication
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2010.00980.xopenalex-snapshot
False‐belief understanding in 2.5‐year‐olds: evidence from violation‐of‐expectation change‐of‐location and unexpected‐contents tasks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2010.01000.xopenalex-snapshot
Young children attribute normativity to novel actions without pedagogy or normative language
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01085.xopenalex-snapshot
Monkeys represent others’ knowledge but not their beliefs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01324.xopenalex-snapshot
Which Penguin Is This? Attributing False Beliefs About Object Identity at 18 Months
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01943.xopenalex-snapshot
Attribution of Beliefs by 13-Month-Old Infants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7078.2011.00105.xopenalex-snapshot
18‐Month‐Olds Predict Specific Action Mistakes Through Attribution of False Belief, Not Ignorance, and Intervene Accordingly
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2008.00115.xopenalex-snapshot
Solving the (Real) Other Minds Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-835x.1987.tb01048.xopenalex-snapshot
Three‐year‐olds' difficulty with false belief: The case for a conceptual deficit
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-835x.2011.02060.xopenalex-snapshot
Breaking the rules: Do infants have a true understanding of false belief?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12014openalex-snapshot
Mindreading in Infancy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12036openalex-snapshot
How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1107621openalex-snapshot
Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False Beliefs?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1190792openalex-snapshot
The Social Sense: Susceptibility to Others’ Beliefs in Human Infants and Adults
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721410386679openalex-snapshot
Toward a Mentalistic Account of Early Psychological Reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691613518076openalex-snapshot
Submentalizing: I Am Not Really Reading Your Mind
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2804075openalex-snapshot
Natural Theories of Mind: Evolution, Development and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3758/bf03198964openalex-snapshot
Self-control in the monkeymacaca fascicularis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.49-2668openalex-snapshot
Mindreading animals: the debate over what animals know about other minds
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.50-4999openalex-snapshot
The Evolution of primate societies

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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We Focus on What Others Know When Reasoning from Positions of Ignorance
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Moral Reasoning
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Chimpanzee uses manipulative gaze cues to conceal and reveal information to foraging competitor
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Do young rhesus macaques know what others see?: A comparative developmental perspective
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Eye‐tracking as a window into primate social cognition
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Individual differences in sociocognitive traits in semi‐free‐ranging rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)
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Why marmosets?
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Developmental shifts in social cognition: socio-emotional biases across the lifespan in rhesus monkeys
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Flexible gaze-following in rhesus monkeys
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Canine perspective-taking
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A computational model of the cultural co-evolution of language and mindreading
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Knowledge-first mentalizing: concept-based or merely state-based?
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The Natural Tendency for Wide and Careful Listening: Exploring the Relationship Between Open-Mindedness and Psychological Science
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The Scapegoat Mechanism in Human Evolution: An Analysis of René Girard’s Hypothesis on the Process of Hominization
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Experimental, Cross-Cultural, and Classical Indian Epistemology
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The Evolution of Primate Executive Function: From Response Control to Strategic Decision-Making
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Early signatures of and developmental change in brain regions for theory of mind
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Social behavior in primates and its neural correlates
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Cognitive adaptations in humans and other great apes
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Living cognition and the nature of organisms
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Theory of Mind in the wild
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Replications of implicit theory of mind tasks with varying representational demands
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What do monkeys know about others’ knowledge?
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Do non-human primates really represent others’ ignorance? A test of the awareness relations hypothesis
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Are monkeys able to discriminate appearance from reality?
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How do non-human primates represent others' awareness of where objects are hidden?
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How do we interpret questions? Simplified representations of knowledge guide humans' interpretation of information requests
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Exploring the evolutionary roots of theory of mind: Primate errors on false belief tasks reveal representational limits
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Mindreading as asynchronous coordination: The MAC account of theory of mind performance, and individual differences
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What primates know about other minds and how often they use it: A computational approach to comparative theory of mind
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The social neuroscience of mentalizing: challenges and recommendations
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Beta oscillations precede joint attention and correlate with mentalization in typical development and autism
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Headmen, shamans, and mothers: Natural and sexual selection for computational services
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Social modulation of cognition: Lessons from rhesus macaques relevant to education
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Brain state flexibility accompanies motor-skill acquisition
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Social Decision-Making and the Brain: A Comparative Perspective
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Social Origins of Cortical Face Areas
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Belief Representation in Great Apes
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Do Non-Human Primates Really Represent Others’ Beliefs?
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Inferential social learning: cognitive foundations of human social learning and teaching
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The Early Years
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Are Children Mind Readers?
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Theory of Mind in Nonhuman Primates
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Knowledge before belief
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The evolution of knowledge during the Cambrian explosion
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Ignorance matters
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Three cognitive mechanisms for knowledge tracking
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Representing knowledge, belief, and everything in between: Representational complexity in humans and other apes
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Predictions about reward outcomes in rhesus monkeys.
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Reframing social cognition: Relational versus representational mentalizing.
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Nonverbal rhetoric: 2- to 4-year-old children select relevant evidence when trying to influence others.
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Children understand that agents maximize expected utilities.
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White matter maturation is associated with the emergence of Theory of Mind in early childhood
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No evidence that monkeys attribute mental states to animated shapes in the Heider–Simmel videos
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Cleaner fish are sensitive to what their partners can and cannot see
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Foundations of theory of mind and its development in early childhood
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Die mentale Welt der Anderen
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Retrospective attribution of false beliefs in 3-year-old children
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Young children infer and manage what others think about them
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Bonobos point more for ignorant than knowledgeable social partners
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Informing does not require attributing ignorance
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Reply to Royka and Santos: Representing ignorance, and the evolution of theory of mind
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Saccade-related LFP power transients in the primate amygdala and hippocampus linked to the perception of social status
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The Primate Origins of Human Social Cognition
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Eye tracking uncovered great apes' ability to anticipate that other individuals will act according to false beliefs
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A test of the submentalizing hypothesis: Apes' performance in a false belief task inanimate control
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Dedicated Representation of Others in the Macaque Frontal Cortex: From Action Monitoring and Prediction to Outcome Evaluation
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Minimal physicalism as a scale-free substrate for cognition and consciousness
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Primate Cognition
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Copyright Page
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Preface to Second Edition
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Introduction to Social Cognition
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General Introduction
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Competition and Cooperation
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Social Strategies and Communication
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Social Learning and Culture
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Theory of Mind and Metacognition
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Evolution of Primate Social Cognition
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The Human Primate
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Shared Agency Without Shared Intention
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Relationalvsrepresentational social cognitive processing: a coordinate-based meta-analysis of neuroimaging data
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Is implicit Theory of Mind real but hard to detect? Testing adults with different stimulus materials
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Rhesus monkeys show human-like changes in gaze following across the lifespan
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Hierarchy processing in human neurobiology: how specific is it?
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Non-human primate token use shows possibilities but also limitations for establishing a form of currency
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Mechanisms of collective learning: how can animal groups improve collective performance when repeating a task?
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Do l’Hoest’s monkeys show sensitivity to conspecifics’ informational state?
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What Primates Know About Other Minds and When They Use It: A Computational Approach to Comparative Theory of Mind
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Reading minds or reading scripts? De‐intellectualising theory of mind
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On the domain specificity of the mechanisms underpinning spontaneous anticipatory looks in false‐belief tasks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12157openalex-snapshot
Factive and nonfactive mental state attribution
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Factive theory of mind
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/mila.70002openalex-snapshot
Knowledge before belief in non‐human primates: A rebuttal
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12494openalex-snapshot
Young children's conceptions of knowledge
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12189openalex-snapshot
Picturing Primates and Looking at Monkeys: Why 21st Century Primatology Needs Wittgenstein
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70016openalex-snapshot
Assertoric mindreading
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/zygo.12896openalex-snapshot
RESPONSIBLE AGENCY: A HUMAN DISTINCTIVE?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-devpsych-111323-115032openalex-snapshot
Theory of Minds: Early Understanding of Interacting Minds
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-neuro-080317-061450openalex-snapshot
Neural Mechanisms of Social Cognition in Primates
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010416-044201openalex-snapshot
Survival of the Friendliest: Homo sapiens Evolved via Selection for Prosociality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.11575/prism/37261openalex-snapshot
The Acoustic Structure and Ontogeny of Vervet Monkey Vocalizations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1162/opmi_a_00087openalex-snapshot
Can 18-Month-Olds Revise Attributed Beliefs?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1163/1568539x-bja10102openalex-snapshot
Tactical deception in sociosexual behaviour of stump-tailed macaques (Macaca arctoides): an exploratory study
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000048openalex-snapshot
Minimal Mindreading and Animal Cognition
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1163/9789004356269openalex-snapshot
Art and Adaptability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1515/tl-2026-3012openalex-snapshot
Common ground and epistemic reasoning: a cognitive-pluralist approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-2524549/v1openalex-snapshot
Neuronal mechanisms of dynamic strategic competition
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.22215/etd/2024-16144openalex-snapshot
Mindreading in Great Apes: Dissolving the Logical Problem and a New Multiple Soft-Indicators Model
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.29007/ttdgopenalex-snapshot
Agent-Based Model for False Belief Tasks: Belief Representation Systematic Approach (BRSA)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/9bcdkopenalex-snapshot
Leadership and prestige, mothering, sexual selection, and encephalization: The computational services model
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/2rm8kopenalex-snapshot
The Evolution of Knowledge during the Cambrian Explosion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/5sqfjopenalex-snapshot
Pragmatics and Language Evolution
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/83zhjopenalex-snapshot
Supplement for: Factive Theory of Mind
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/8x52topenalex-snapshot
Theory of Mind in the Wild
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/q79bzopenalex-snapshot
No signatures of first-person biases in Theory of Mind judgments about thinking
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/upwmqopenalex-snapshot
Three cognitive mechanisms for knowledge tracking: commentary on Phillips et al, 2020, BBS
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/x4jbmopenalex-snapshot
Action anticipation based on an agent's epistemic state in toddlers and adults
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/yxhv5openalex-snapshot
Young children infer and manage what others think about them
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.32603/2412-8562-2022-8-2-17-27openalex-snapshot
Machines and Human Epistemology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3280/para2017-002004openalex-snapshot
The contribution of primatology to anthropology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.988754openalex-snapshot
Knowledge before belief ascription? Yes and no (depending on the type of “knowledge” under consideration)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2019.00122openalex-snapshot
The Protracted Maturation of Associative Layer IIIC Pyramidal Neurons in the Human Prefrontal Cortex During Childhood: A Major Role in Cognitive Development and Selective Alteration in Autism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3724/sp.j.1042.2022.02540openalex-snapshot
Comparative studies of mind reading: Similarities and differences in theory of mind between non-human primates and humans and corresponding explanations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-016-0445-0openalex-snapshot
Multidimensional assessment of empathic abilities in patients with insular glioma
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4000/primatologie.2781openalex-snapshot
Les primates non humains ont-ils une théorie de l’esprit ?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.51291/2377-7478.1366openalex-snapshot
Anthropocentrism as cognitive dissonance in animal research?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.70675/34c56888zf035z4ab0zba21z1221fd7f4be3openalex-snapshot
La représentation de l’informativité chez l’enfant
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.7554/elife.105034openalex-snapshot
Dynamic modulation of social gaze by sex and familiarity in marmoset dyads
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.7554/elife.105034.1openalex-snapshot
Dynamic modulation of social gaze by sex and familiarity in marmoset dyads
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.7554/elife.105034.2openalex-snapshot
Dynamic modulation of social gaze by sex and familiarity in marmoset dyads
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.7554/elife.105034.3openalex-snapshot
Dynamic modulation of social gaze by sex and familiarity in marmoset dyads
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