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Reform for Sale

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0637openalex-snapshot

Efficient Private Production of Public Goods under Common Agency

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1034openalex-snapshot

Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2236openalex-snapshot

Equilibrium Binding Agreements

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2702openalex-snapshot

Conflict and Cooperation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01726210openalex-snapshot

Multipart pricing of public goods

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01753431openalex-snapshot

Cores of convex games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(95)00079-8openalex-snapshot

The multiprincipal nature of government

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90058-7openalex-snapshot

On moral hazard in general equilibrium theory

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90099-8openalex-snapshot

Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(85)90063-5openalex-snapshot

Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(86)90024-1openalex-snapshot

On the private provision of public goods

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(83)90087-3openalex-snapshot

The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0176-2680(94)90005-1openalex-snapshot

Political appointees vs. career civil servants: A multiple principals theory of political bureaucracies

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.10.021openalex-snapshot

A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.02.036openalex-snapshot

The pluralistic view of politics: Asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.005openalex-snapshot

Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.010openalex-snapshot

Information transmission and inefficient lobbying

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.006openalex-snapshot

Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.005openalex-snapshot

Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.010openalex-snapshot

Selecting equilibria in common agency games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2008.03.003openalex-snapshot

Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.09.007openalex-snapshot

On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.10.004openalex-snapshot

Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(97)00079-2openalex-snapshot

Lobbying by capital and labor over trade and labor market policies

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00130-3openalex-snapshot

Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(00)00134-1openalex-snapshot

Inefficient equilibria in lobbying

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(02)00142-1openalex-snapshot

Lobbying under political uncertainty

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00006-1openalex-snapshot

Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009004794openalex-snapshot

Can Blockchain Solve the Hold-up Problem in Contracts?

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009049030openalex-snapshot

The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Behavior

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009285605openalex-snapshot

Reform for Sale

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009296403openalex-snapshot

Deep IV in Law

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511609312openalex-snapshot

Delegating Powers

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1057/gpp.1983.7openalex-snapshot

Moral Hazard and Monopolistically Competitive Insurance Markets

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/262092openalex-snapshot

Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/466865openalex-snapshot

Toward a More General Theory of Regulation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/707586openalex-snapshot

“When Olson Meets Dahl”: From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy Making

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/16.2.269openalex-snapshot

The American system of shared powers: the President, Congress, and the NLRB

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdu025openalex-snapshot

Contractible Contracts in Common Agency Problems

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00332openalex-snapshot

Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Competition for Political Influence

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00075openalex-snapshot

The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00160openalex-snapshot

Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00257openalex-snapshot

Public-Good Provision with Many Participants

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.2012.00737.xopenalex-snapshot

STATIC COMMON AGENCY AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE: AN EVALUATIVE SURVEY

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00279.xopenalex-snapshot

Passive Industry Interests in a Large Polity

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2007.5.2-3.614openalex-snapshot

Political Biases in Lobbying under Asymmetric Information

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.5.1116openalex-snapshot

Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170189openalex-snapshot

Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and the role of Debt Covenants

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829453openalex-snapshot

The Theory of Incentives

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1628/0932456022975231openalex-snapshot

Special Interest Politics

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2569703openalex-snapshot

Menu Auctions and Influence Games with Private Information

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5963.1037openalex-snapshot

Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0637.1008openalex-snapshot

Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1593693openalex-snapshot

Moral Hazard and Nonexclusive Contracts

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1881793openalex-snapshot

Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1884639openalex-snapshot

Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1886017openalex-snapshot

A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911219openalex-snapshot

Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912246openalex-snapshot

An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912844openalex-snapshot

Common Agency

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913238openalex-snapshot

Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1914085openalex-snapshot

Incentives in Teams

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2298018openalex-snapshot

Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2390734openalex-snapshot

Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555512openalex-snapshot

Noncooperative Regulation of a Nonlocalized Externality

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/258982openalex-snapshot

Organization Theory from Chester Barnard to the Present and beyond

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951499openalex-snapshot

Common Agency: Existence of an Equilibrium in the Case of Two Outcomes

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003192openalex-snapshot

The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320openalex-snapshot

Moral Hazard and Observability

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w3588openalex-snapshot

Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3917/reco.696.1025openalex-snapshot

Une revue critique de la théorie de l’agence commune appliquée aux jeux de lobbies

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8375openalex-snapshot

Definable and Contractible Contracts

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te2992openalex-snapshot

Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te507openalex-snapshot

Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te567openalex-snapshot

Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674041660openalex-snapshot

The Logic of Collective Action

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.37-1214openalex-snapshot

Lobbying together: interest group coalitions in legislative politics

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4391.001.0001openalex-snapshot

The Making of Economic Policy

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4716135openalex-extracted

Multi-regulation and Moral Hazard

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009217965openalex-snapshot

A Safety Valve Model of Equity as Anti-opportunism

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009396059openalex-snapshot

More is Less

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009417938openalex-snapshot

FinTech Regulation in the United States

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009499736openalex-snapshot

Corruption and the Voter's Decision

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5098715openalex-snapshot

Political Liberalization and State Capture by Business Interests

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