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log[P(h/eb)/P(h/b)] Is the One True Measure of Confirmation
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781316534960openalex-snapshot
Logic of Statistical Inference
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/55.3.213openalex-snapshot
A Bayesian Defence of Popperian Science?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1993.tb00256.xopenalex-snapshot
Epistemology for Empiricists
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2314998openalex-snapshot
Lectures on Functional Equations and their Applications.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2981046openalex-snapshot
Probability and the Weighing of Evidence.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5840/msp20174114openalex-snapshot
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1976-2017
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.32-0275openalex-snapshot
Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.120openalex-snapshot
Independent Tests and the Log-Likelihood-Ratio Measure of Confirmation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04522-7_14openalex-snapshot
A Formal Account of Epistemic Defeat
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53730-6_23openalex-snapshot
Generalized Confirmation and Relevance Measures
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99157-3_6openalex-snapshot
Abduction and Confirmation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-25929-9_31openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Confirmation Measures within Rough Set Approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3263-8_7openalex-snapshot
Towards a Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9115-4_7openalex-snapshot
Formal and Empirical Methods in Philosophy of Science
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9246-yopenalex-snapshot
Coherence and Reliability: The Case of Overlapping Testimonies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9672-3openalex-snapshot
Keynes’s Coefficient of Dependence Revisited
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00724-0openalex-snapshot
Hesse’s Condition for Transitivity of Probabilistic Support: A Friendly Reminder
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-012-9175-3openalex-snapshot
On Ratio Measures of Confirmation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0500-7openalex-snapshot
A problem for confirmation theoretic accounts of the conjunction fallacy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9062-9openalex-snapshot
The Consistency Argument for Ranking Functions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-016-9690-zopenalex-snapshot
Genuine Coherence as Mutual Confirmation Between Content Elements
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-3492-6openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Confirmation Theory and The Likelihood Principle
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9056-6openalex-snapshot
Reliability conducive measures of coherence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9134-9openalex-snapshot
Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and relational confirmation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9155-4openalex-snapshot
Equivalent testimonies as a touchstone of coherence measures
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9698-2openalex-snapshot
Is the conjunction fallacy tied to probabilistic confirmation?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9856-6openalex-snapshot
Coherence reasoning and reliability: a defense of the Shogenji measure
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9961-1openalex-snapshot
Irrelevant conjunction and the ratio measure or historical skepticism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0087-xopenalex-snapshot
Empirical evidence claims are a priori
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0501-7openalex-snapshot
Probabilistic measures of coherence: from adequacy constraints towards pluralism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0870-6openalex-snapshot
On the role of explanatory and systematic power in scientific reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0918-7openalex-snapshot
Does information inform confirmation?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1132-yopenalex-snapshot
Extending the argument from unconceived alternatives: observations, models, predictions, explanations, methods, instruments, experiments, and values
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1286-7openalex-snapshot
Is there a place in Bayesian confirmation theory for the Reverse Matthew Effect?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-017-0322-7openalex-snapshot
Confirmation, Increase in Probability, and the Likelihood Ratio Measure: a Reply to Glass and McCartney
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-012-0059-5openalex-snapshot
The role of Bayesian philosophy within Bayesian model selection
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00630-4openalex-snapshot
Stopping rule and Bayesian confirmation theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s42519-026-00600-4openalex-snapshot
The Bayes e-Value: Testing by Betting Given a Prior Probability of the Null Hypothesis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-51862-0.50030-7openalex-snapshot
MML, Hybrid Bayesian Network Graphical Models, Statistical Consistency, Invariance and Uniqueness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-044451548-3/50005-7openalex-snapshot
Evaluation of Theories
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.engappai.2004.04.008openalex-snapshot
Can Bayesian confirmation measures be useful for rough set decision rules?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2013.03.002openalex-snapshot
Confirmation as partial entailment: A representation theorem in inductive logic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2012.11.011openalex-snapshot
Kuhn vs. Popper on criticism and dogmatism in science, part II: How to strike the balance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009210171openalex-snapshot
Probability and Inductive Logic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x0900051xopenalex-snapshot
The uncertain reasoner: Bayes, logic, and rationality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020310000298openalex-snapshot
FURTHER RESULTS ON THE INTRANSITIVITY OF EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1014712013453openalex-snapshot
Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1022034427230openalex-snapshot
A Bayesian Way to Make Stopping Rules Matter
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2014.993665openalex-snapshot
Information as a Probabilistic Difference Maker
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2025.2532279openalex-snapshot
The Paradox of Irrelevant Conjunction and a Bayesian Analysis of Pursuit Worthy Confirmation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/13546780701643406openalex-snapshot
Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/344624openalex-snapshot
Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/375475openalex-snapshot
A Bayesian Account of the Virtue of Unification
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/392738openalex-snapshot
The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/392903openalex-snapshot
A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/423750openalex-snapshot
Bayesianism and Irrelevant Conjunction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/518320openalex-snapshot
Logical Foundations of Evidential Support
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/595838openalex-snapshot
Milne's Argument for the Log-Ratio Measure
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/598164openalex-snapshot
How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/650205openalex-snapshot
Irrelevant Conjunction: Statement and Solution of a New Paradox
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/659218openalex-snapshot
Focused Correlation, Confirmation, and the Jigsaw Puzzle of Variable Evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/671172openalex-snapshot
The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/674205openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Measures of Confirmation from Scoring Rules
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/688936openalex-snapshot
A Representation Theorem for Absolute Confirmation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/713907openalex-snapshot
A Conflict between Indexical Credal Transparency and Relevance Confirmation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anp103openalex-snapshot
An argument for the likelihood-ratio measure of confirmation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/50.2.249openalex-snapshot
The Quantitative Problem of Old Evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axi117openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axm019openalex-snapshot
Solving the Tacking Problem with Contrast Classes
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axn008openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: A Reply to Huber [2005]
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axs018openalex-snapshot
New Axioms for Probability and Likelihood Ratio Measures
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axy005openalex-snapshot
Genuine Confirmation and Tacking by Conjunction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12259openalex-snapshot
Judging the Probability of Hypotheses Versus the Impact of Evidence: Which Form of Inductive Inference Is More Accurate and Time‐Consistent?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01451.xopenalex-snapshot
Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12232openalex-snapshot
Fine‐tuning, weird sorts of atheism and evidential favouring
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000161openalex-snapshot
Is Evidential Support the Same as Increase-in-Probability?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.12485openalex-snapshot
Inconsistency as a Touchstone for Coherence Measures
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.15168/11572_369131openalex-snapshot
Bayesian confirmation by uncertain evidence: epistemological and psychological issues
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1838openalex-snapshot
A Logic for Reasoning about Evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2143/lea.226.0.3032652openalex-snapshot
Information versus knowledge in confirmation theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.70675/1dfc9503z30eez4554za597zdd6658262d15openalex-snapshot
Development and verification of probability logics and logical frameworks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.7468/mathedu.2016.55.2.193openalex-snapshot
A Study on Analysis of Likelihood Principle and its Educational Implications
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