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The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3263-8_7openalex-snapshot
Towards a Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00485428openalex-snapshot
Inductive inconsistencies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-3492-6openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Confirmation Theory and The Likelihood Principle
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-6599(86)90019-7openalex-snapshot
Philosophical explanations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511498497openalex-snapshot
The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1014712013453openalex-snapshot
Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/287214openalex-snapshot
Degree of Factual Support
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/289891openalex-snapshot
log[P(h/eb)/P(h/b)] Is the One True Measure of Confirmation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/344624openalex-snapshot
Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/392738openalex-snapshot
The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/423626openalex-snapshot
Discussion: Re-solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/508961openalex-snapshot
What Is the Point of Confirmation?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/518320openalex-snapshot
Logical Foundations of Evidential Support
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/520779openalex-snapshot
On Bayesian Measures of Evidential Support: Theoretical and Empirical Issues
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/595838openalex-snapshot
Milne's Argument for the Log-Ratio Measure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/650205openalex-snapshot
Irrelevant Conjunction: Statement and Solution of a New Paradox
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/v.18.143openalex-snapshot
Degree of Confirmation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/liv.213.1openalex-snapshot
I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (I.)
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/liv.214.97openalex-snapshot
I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (II.)
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Weight of Evidence, Corroboration, Explanatory Power, Information and the Utility of Experiments
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2011
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1907654openalex-snapshot
Logical Foundations of Probability
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The Logical Foundations of Probability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2183724openalex-snapshot
Probability and Evidence.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2185741openalex-snapshot
Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2268645openalex-snapshot
Rudolf Carnap and Yehoshua Bar-Hillel. An outline of a theory of semantic information. Technical report no. 247. Photo-offset. Research Laboratory of Electronics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., 1952, ii + 49 pp. - Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Rudolf Carnap. Semantic…
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2564680openalex-snapshot
Calibration and the Epistemological Role of Bayesian Conditionalization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2564707openalex-snapshot
Measuring Confirmation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.30-2728openalex-snapshot
Bayes or bust?: a critical examination of Bayesian confirmation theory

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29179-2_9openalex-snapshot
A Millian Look at the Logic of Clinical Trials
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53730-6_21openalex-snapshot
Truthlikeness and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53730-6_23openalex-snapshot
Generalized Confirmation and Relevance Measures
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9672-3openalex-snapshot
Keynes’s Coefficient of Dependence Revisited
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0087-4openalex-snapshot
Approaching Truth in Conceptual Spaces
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00202-6openalex-snapshot
The Likelihood Ratio Measure and the Logicality Requirement
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00822-7openalex-snapshot
Conditionals: Inferentialism Explicated
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-015-9348-8openalex-snapshot
Inductive Logic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-014-9601-0openalex-snapshot
Towards a Grammar of Bayesian Coherentism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-016-9690-zopenalex-snapshot
Genuine Coherence as Mutual Confirmation Between Content Elements
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0488-0openalex-snapshot
Coherence, striking agreement, and reliability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0870-6openalex-snapshot
On the role of explanatory and systematic power in scientific reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0937-4openalex-snapshot
Competing accounts of contrastive coherence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1286-7openalex-snapshot
Is there a place in Bayesian confirmation theory for the Reverse Matthew Effect?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-03011-5openalex-snapshot
Explicating the concept of epistemic rationality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03516-1openalex-snapshot
Approaching probabilistic truths: introduction to the Topical Collection
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-017-0322-7openalex-snapshot
Confirmation, Increase in Probability, and the Likelihood Ratio Measure: a Reply to Glass and McCartney
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-017-0359-yopenalex-snapshot
Rational Relations Between Perception and Belief: The Case of Color
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0381-8openalex-snapshot
Sleeping Beauty Goes to the Lab: The Psychology of Self-Locating Evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00630-4openalex-snapshot
Stopping rule and Bayesian confirmation theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.05.002openalex-snapshot
State of the field: Measuring information and confirmation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.05.010openalex-snapshot
Acceptance, values, and probability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s175502031500009xopenalex-snapshot
EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT, TRANSITIVITY, AND SCREENING-OFF
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1037/a0039539openalex-snapshot
Noisy probability judgment, the conjunction fallacy, and rationality: Comment on Costello and Watts (2014).
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/674346openalex-snapshot
Dwindling Confirmation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/688935openalex-snapshot
Unfolding the Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation: Likelihood and Antilikelihood Principles
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/688936openalex-snapshot
A Representation Theorem for Absolute Confirmation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz035openalex-snapshot
Plenty of room left for the Dogmatist
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axu004openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axw016openalex-snapshot
Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axw025openalex-snapshot
Information and Inaccuracy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axy005openalex-snapshot
Genuine Confirmation and Tacking by Conjunction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzw028openalex-snapshot
Bayesian coherentism and the problem of measure sensitivity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198829775.003.0003openalex-snapshot
Evidence of Evidence as Higher-Order Evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199672110.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Confirmation and Induction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12259openalex-snapshot
Judging the Probability of Hypotheses Versus the Impact of Evidence: Which Form of Inductive Inference Is More Accurate and Time‐Consistent?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12613openalex-snapshot
Generalized Information Theory Meets Human Cognition: Introducing a Unified Framework to Model Uncertainty and Information Search
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1163/9789004312654_009openalex-snapshot
Justification, Confirmation, and the Problem of Mutually Exclusive Hypotheses
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-6718797openalex-snapshot
Foundations of a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength
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