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On the Trade-off between Efficiency in Job Assignment and Turnover: The Role of Breakup Fees
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.013openalex-snapshot
Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.02.003openalex-snapshot
Classic promotion tournaments versus market-based tournaments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.03.016openalex-snapshot
Promotion signaling, gender, and turnover: New theory and evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00164-7openalex-snapshot
Golden cages for showy birds: Optimal switching costs in labor contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s1474747206002617openalex-snapshot
What can the life-cycle model tell us about 401(k) contributions and participation?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/209884openalex-snapshot
Promotion, Turnover, and Discretionary Human Capital Acquisition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/298221openalex-snapshot
Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/428705openalex-snapshot
Counteroffers and Efficiency in Labor Markets with Asymmetric Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/467672openalex-snapshot
Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/662072openalex-snapshot
The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewp033openalex-snapshot
Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewq021openalex-snapshot
Star Wars: Exclusive Talent and Collusive Outcomes in Labor Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewv016openalex-snapshot
An Exploration of the Promotion Signaling Distortion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1108/s0147-9121(2011)0000032015openalex-snapshot
Research in Labor Economics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1108/s0147-912120140000040019openalex-snapshot
Research in Labor Economics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00186openalex-snapshot
Corporate Tournaments, Human Capital Acquisition, and the Firm Size-Wage Relation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12211openalex-snapshot
Job Characteristics and Labor Market Discrimination in Promotions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00023.xopenalex-snapshot
Sustaining implicit contracts when agents have career concerns: the role of information disclosure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00511.xopenalex-snapshot
CAREER CONCERNS, MATCHING, AND OPTIMAL DISCLOSURE POLICY*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00525.xopenalex-snapshot
SHOULD YOU ALLOW YOUR EMPLOYEE TO BECOME YOUR COMPETITOR? ON NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00187.xopenalex-snapshot
Covenants not to Compete, Labor Mobility, and Industry Dynamics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03766.xopenalex-snapshot
Stock and Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00674.xopenalex-snapshot
Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00060.xopenalex-snapshot
Spin-outs: knowledge diffusion through employee mobility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00101.xopenalex-snapshot
Standard promotion practices versus up-or-out contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00111.xopenalex-snapshot
The optimal disclosure policy when firms offer implicit contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12132openalex-snapshot
Promotion Signals, Experience, and Education
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.15779/z38kd1vopenalex-snapshot
Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility against Legal Protection for Human Capital Investment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.124508openalex-snapshot
The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2135198openalex-snapshot
Job Characteristics and Labor Market Discrimination in Promotions: New Theory and Empirical Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2220043openalex-snapshot
Training Contracts, Worker Overconfidence, and the Provision of Firm-Sponsored General Training
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.273215openalex-snapshot
Promotion: Turnover and Preemptive Wage Offers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1057230openalex-snapshot
Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1884213openalex-snapshot
Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1885325openalex-snapshot
Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor Market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911081openalex-snapshot
Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2118351openalex-snapshot
The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297632openalex-snapshot
Adverse Selection in the Labour Market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297986openalex-snapshot
Involuntary Layoffs in a Model with Asymmetric Information Concerning Worker Ability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555679openalex-snapshot
Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555912openalex-snapshot
On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429023507openalex-snapshot
Adverse Selection in the Labor Market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.51-3957openalex-snapshot
Talent wants to be free: why we should learn to love leaks, raids, and free riding
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2572036openalex-extracted
Talent Discovery and Poaching under Asymmetric Information
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4751862openalex-extracted
Intra-firm Employer Learning, Talent Hoarding and Worker Visibility
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-020-00215-3openalex-snapshot
Agency theory meets matching theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.10.017openalex-snapshot
Optimal tolerance for failure
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2022.102270openalex-snapshot
Employee entrepreneurship and signaling role of corporate venturing decisions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifae001openalex-snapshot
Equilibrium Poaching in Labor Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueac048openalex-snapshot
Talent Discovery and Poaching Under Asymmetric Information
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewv016openalex-snapshot
An Exploration of the Promotion Signaling Distortion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12404openalex-snapshot
Worker visibility and firms' retention policies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12499openalex-snapshot
Employee bonding and turnover efficiency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12641openalex-snapshot
Organizational Design With Portable Skills
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/meca.12286openalex-snapshot
Human capital acquisition as a competitive response to the promotion distortion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/meca.12374openalex-snapshot
Human capital acquisition as a signaling device in promotion competition
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1155/2022/9245876openalex-snapshot
Job Matching Analysis Based on Text Mining and Multicriteria Decision-Making
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180285openalex-snapshot
Promotion Signaling and Human Capital Investments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2847557openalex-snapshot
Entrepreneurship in Equilibrium: A Signaling Approach
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