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A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444301625openalex-snapshot
Liquidated Damages and Extensions of Time
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0607openalex-snapshot
The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1058openalex-snapshot
Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.9999openalex-snapshot
Starting Small and Renegotiation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00134817openalex-snapshot
Regulation and administered contracts revisited: Lessons from transaction-cost economics for public utility regulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0555-8openalex-snapshot
Regulating a monopolist with limited funds
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11747-015-0427-8openalex-snapshot
Understanding and resolving major contractual breaches in buyer–seller relationships: a grounded theory approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0openalex-snapshot
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90083-5openalex-snapshot
Countervailing incentives in agency problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(84)90060-4openalex-snapshot
A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)00601-wopenalex-snapshot
The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6245(84)90006-4openalex-snapshot
Regulation and information in a continuing relationship
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4openalex-snapshot
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90033-7openalex-snapshot
Lagrange multipliers in infinite horizon discrete time optimal control models
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.004openalex-snapshot
The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with side payments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.009openalex-snapshot
Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.010openalex-snapshot
Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.007openalex-snapshot
Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00628-0openalex-snapshot
Non-linear pricing with budget constraint
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(97)00030-xopenalex-snapshot
Lagrange multipliers in incentive-constrained problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511510809openalex-snapshot
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/0198288816.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/18.1.221openalex-snapshot
Courts and Relational Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/20.1.2openalex-snapshot
The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewh022openalex-snapshot
The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewn017openalex-snapshot
Incentive Contracts with Enforcement Costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdw035openalex-snapshot
Information Revelation in Relational Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12005openalex-snapshot
NONSTATIONARY RELATIONAL CONTRACTS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12168openalex-snapshot
Role of Information Rents in Relational Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157115openalex-snapshot
Relational Incentive Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828042002606openalex-snapshot
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054201369openalex-snapshot
Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.7.3349openalex-snapshot
Relational Contracts and the Value of Loyalty
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.2.750openalex-snapshot
Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.6.2767openalex-snapshot
But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.6.2328openalex-snapshot
Managing Conflicts in Relational Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.2.212openalex-snapshot
Bringing the Market Inside the Firm?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.4.1432openalex-snapshot
Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.5.2193openalex-snapshot
Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130111openalex-snapshot
Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0229openalex-snapshot
Incentives Between Firms (and Within)
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400845354-025openalex-snapshot
23. Contracts between Legal Persons
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400845354-027openalex-snapshot
25. Relational Incentive Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3011openalex-snapshot
Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1434499openalex-snapshot
Contracts as Threats: On a Rationale for Rewarding A While Hoping for B
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1620662openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1841566openalex-snapshot
Reputation and Portfolio Management Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.313680openalex-snapshot
Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5971.1030openalex-snapshot
Bilateral Trade and Opportunism in a Matching Market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1881782openalex-snapshot
Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1884685openalex-snapshot
The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911077openalex-snapshot
On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912562openalex-snapshot
Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912769openalex-snapshot
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2090458openalex-snapshot
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2118358openalex-snapshot
Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2171836openalex-snapshot
On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297403openalex-snapshot
Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297892openalex-snapshot
Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555448openalex-snapshot
Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555481openalex-snapshot
Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555660openalex-snapshot
Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555972openalex-snapshot
The Commitment Value of Contracts under Dynamic Renegotiation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2937812openalex-snapshot
Renegotiation and Information Revelation over Time: The Case of Optimal Labor Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003374openalex-snapshot
Damage Measures for Breach of Contract
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10269openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10946openalex-snapshot
Relational Incentive Contracts With Persistent Private Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9557openalex-snapshot
Efficiency in Games With Markovian Private Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te701openalex-snapshot
Dynamic monopoly with relational incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674043497openalex-snapshot
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5065078openalex-extracted
Buying In and Selling Out: The Dynamic Returns to Investing in Expertise
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.007openalex-snapshot
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102876openalex-snapshot
The value of transparency in dynamic contracting with entry
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2025.2537343openalex-snapshot
The effect of repeated games on demand information transparency and manufacturer's sales decisions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvx031openalex-snapshot
Self-Selection and Comparative Advantage in Social Interactions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12204openalex-snapshot
From fixed to state‐dependent duration in public‐private partnerships
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12386openalex-snapshot
Collusion Between Supply Chains under Asymmetric Information*
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3180551openalex-snapshot
Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3219686openalex-snapshot
The Value of Sales Information in Repeated Vertical Relationships
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3308510openalex-snapshot
Design of Incentive Programs for Optimal Medication Adherence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5397962openalex-snapshot
Relational Frictions Along the Supply Chain: Evidence from Senegalese Traders
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.21779/2500-1930-2019-34-3-39-43openalex-snapshot
Contemporary conditions for the functioning of the new contract economy
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