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Buying In and Selling Out: The Dynamic Returns to Investing in Expertise

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A Recursive Formulation for Repeated Agency with History Dependence
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Relational contracts in a persistent environment
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Maximum principles for jump diffusion processes with infinite horizon
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Sequential contracting with multiple principals
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Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks
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Dynamic revenue maximization: A continuous time approach
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A solvable continuous time dynamic principal–agent model
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A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints
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Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited
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Formal and Real Authority in Organizations
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Counteroffers and Efficiency in Labor Markets with Asymmetric Information
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Incentives and Performance with Optimal Money Management Contracts
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User’s guide to viscosity solutions of second order partial differential equations
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Efficient Allocations in Dynamic Private Information Economies with Persistent Shocks: A First-Order Approach
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A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
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Two-Sided Learning and the Ratchet Principle
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Corporate Tournaments, Human Capital Acquisition, and the Firm Size-Wage Relation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00188openalex-extracted
Repeated Bargaining with Persistent Private Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00245openalex-extracted
Common Agency and the Revelation Principle
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12275openalex-extracted
Dynamic financial contracting with persistent private information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12770openalex-extracted
CEO Horizon, Optimal Pay Duration, and the Escalation of Short-Termism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555531openalex-extracted
Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555568openalex-extracted
The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20171939openalex-extracted
Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180427openalex-extracted
Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.37.1.7openalex-extracted
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160277openalex-extracted
Career Concerns and the Nature of Skills
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200192openalex-extracted
Learning by Choosing: Career Concerns with Observable Actions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2503407openalex-extracted
Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4309204openalex-extracted
Effort and Selection Effects of Performance Pay in Knowledge Creation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w3792openalex-extracted
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10269openalex-extracted
Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10946openalex-extracted
Relational Incentive Contracts With Persistent Private Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14929openalex-extracted
Optimal Asset Management Contracts With Hidden Savings
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7706openalex-extracted
Persistent Private Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te2115openalex-extracted
Career concerns with exponential learning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261826openalex-snapshot
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00083openalex-snapshot
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3480765openalex-snapshot
Flows and Performance with Optimal Money Management Contracts
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