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A Formal Theory of Key Conjuring

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/11532231_24openalex-snapshot
Deduction with XOR Constraints in Security API Modelling
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/11532231_25openalex-snapshot
On the Complexity of Equational Horn Clauses
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36400-5_42openalex-snapshot
Experience Using a Low-Cost FPGA Design to Crack DES Keys
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44709-1_19openalex-snapshot
Attacks on Cryptoprocessor Transaction Sets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44881-0_12openalex-snapshot
New Decidability Results for Fragments of First-Order Logic and Application to Cryptographic Protocols
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-32033-3_22openalex-snapshot
The Finite Variant Property: How to Get Rid of Some Algebraic Properties
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45238-6_32openalex-snapshot
On the Security of PKCS #11
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71209-1_42openalex-snapshot
Automatic Analysis of the Security of XOR-Based Key Management Schemes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17773-6_21openalex-snapshot
Robbing the Bank with a Theorem Prover
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/csf.2007.5openalex-snapshot
A Formal Theory of Key Conjuring
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/lics.2003.1210066openalex-snapshot
An NP decision procedure for protocol insecurity with XOR
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/lics.2003.1210067openalex-snapshot
Intruder deductions, constraint solving and insecurity decision in presence of exclusive or
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/tit.1983.1056650openalex-snapshot
On the security of public key protocols

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_873openalex-snapshot
Formal Analysis of Security APIs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10817-010-9188-8openalex-snapshot
Reducing Protocol Analysis with XOR to the XOR-Free Case in the Horn Theory Based Approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/csf.2008.16openalex-snapshot
Formal Analysis of PKCS#11
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/csf.2008.21openalex-snapshot
Towards Producing Formally Checkable Security Proofs, Automatically
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/csf.2009.7openalex-snapshot
A Secure Cryptographic Token Interface
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/1455770.1455788openalex-snapshot
Reducing protocol analysis with XOR to the XOR-free case in the horn theory based approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-2009-0394openalex-snapshot
Formal security analysis of PKCS#11 and proprietary extensions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-2009-0395openalex-snapshot
Finite models for formal security proofs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.0808.0634openalex-snapshot
Reducing Protocol Analysis with XOR to the XOR-free Case in the Horn Theory Based Approach
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