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Optimal mechanisms with simple menus

https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602863
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0534openalex-snapshot
An Optimal Auction for Complements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.007openalex-snapshot
Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.12.007openalex-snapshot
Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1309533110openalex-snapshot
On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2012.88openalex-snapshot
Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973105.41openalex-snapshot
Simple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1250910.1250945openalex-snapshot
Optimal combinatoric auctions with single-minded bidders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1566374.1566407openalex-snapshot
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1806689.1806733openalex-snapshot
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993634openalex-snapshot
Money for nothing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2213977.2214021openalex-snapshot
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2229012.2229042openalex-snapshot
Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2229012.2229061openalex-snapshot
Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2482540.2482593openalex-snapshot
Mechanism design via optimal transport
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2492002.2482544openalex-snapshot
The menu-size complexity of auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2492002.2482593openalex-snapshot
Mechanism design via optimal transport
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1663openalex-snapshot
A Property of Solutions to Linear Monopoly Problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1664openalex-snapshot
Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913516openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te1517openalex-snapshot
Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1112.4006openalex-snapshot
On Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1204.1846openalex-snapshot
Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4792793openalex-extracted
On Deterministic Optimal Mechanisms in Two-Item Setting for Distributions with Nondecreasing Density
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47666-6_52openalex-snapshot
Selling Two Goods Optimally
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_13openalex-snapshot
Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8132-8_42openalex-snapshot
Improving Deep Learning Powered Auction Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.011openalex-snapshot
On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2015.93openalex-snapshot
On the Complexity of Optimal Lottery Pricing and Randomized Mechanisms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/icde65448.2025.00120openalex-snapshot
CDA: Cost-Sensitive Data Acquisition for Incomplete Datasets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975031.132openalex-snapshot
The menu complexity of “one-and-a-half-dimensional” mechanism design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602883openalex-snapshot
Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2692375.2692377openalex-snapshot
Notes from the EC'14 program chairs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2692375.2692378openalex-snapshot
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2728732.2728736openalex-snapshot
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764498openalex-snapshot
Reverse Mechanism Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940766openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auctions for Negatively Correlated Items
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085120openalex-snapshot
Dominant-Strategy versus Bayesian Multi-item Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399454openalex-snapshot
Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3434419openalex-snapshot
A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3589334.3645345openalex-snapshot
On Truthful Item-Acquiring Mechanisms for Reward Maximization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3696410.3714594openalex-snapshot
Optimizing Revenue through User Coupon Recommendations in Truthful Online Ad Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10578openalex-snapshot
Fans Economy and All-Pay Auctions with Proportional Allocations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16711openalex-snapshot
A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1404.1341openalex-snapshot
Multi-dimensional Virtual Values and Second-degree Price Discrimination
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1404.2329openalex-snapshot
Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1607.03685openalex-snapshot
On Solutions for the Maximum Revenue Multi-item Auction under Dominant-Strategy and Bayesian Implementations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1802.02751openalex-snapshot
Monopoly pricing with buyer search
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1809.05207openalex-snapshot
A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.65109/gezs6576openalex-snapshot
Learning to Design Coupons in Online Advertising Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.65109/letg2194openalex-snapshot
Optimized Cost per Mille in Feeds Advertising
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.65109/lyfs2964openalex-snapshot
Ex-post IR Dynamic Auctions with Cost-per-action Payments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.65109/zedv3738openalex-snapshot
Buyer Signaling Games in Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.7916/d8mw2nvdopenalex-snapshot
On the Complexity of Market Equilibria and Revenue Maximization
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