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Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions

https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602883
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bfb0064545openalex-snapshot
Radical Banach Algebras and Automatic Continuity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0012-365x(91)90327-xopenalex-snapshot
Infinite matching theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90135-4openalex-snapshot
Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(85)90015-1openalex-snapshot
The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.002openalex-snapshot
Haggling over substitutes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.007openalex-snapshot
Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.12.007openalex-snapshot
Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511800481.015openalex-snapshot
Profit Maximization in Mechanism Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1309533110openalex-snapshot
On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1090/s0002-9904-1949-09320-5openalex-snapshot
An inequality related to the isoperimetric inequality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1112/blms/27.5.417openalex-snapshot
Projections of Bodies and Hereditary Properties of Hypergraphs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1250910.1250946openalex-snapshot
Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2229012.2229042openalex-snapshot
Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2229012.2229061openalex-snapshot
Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2482540.2482593openalex-snapshot
Mechanism design via optimal transport
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2492002.2482544openalex-snapshot
The menu-size complexity of auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2492002.2482593openalex-snapshot
Mechanism design via optimal transport
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602863openalex-snapshot
Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1215/s0012-7094-55-02268-7openalex-snapshot
Graphs and matching theorems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1664openalex-snapshot
Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1204.1846openalex-snapshot
Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2907118openalex-extracted
Large-Scale Bundle Size Pricing: A Theoretical Analysis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3219680openalex-extracted
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Screening with Limited Information: The Minimax Theorem and a Geometric Approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4561235openalex-extracted
Countering Value Uncertainty via Refunds: A Mechanism Design Approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4792793openalex-extracted
On Deterministic Optimal Mechanisms in Two-Item Setting for Distributions with Nondecreasing Density
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_25openalex-snapshot
Optimal Mechanism Design with Risk-Loving Agents
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_70openalex-snapshot
Machine Learning for Optimal Economic Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-03639-1_20openalex-snapshot
Deterministic Refund Mechanisms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47666-6_52openalex-snapshot
Selling Two Goods Optimally
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_12openalex-snapshot
A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_13openalex-snapshot
Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-021-01615-4openalex-snapshot
Robust Multidimensional Pricing: Separation Without Regret
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.016openalex-snapshot
The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.007openalex-snapshot
Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.001openalex-snapshot
The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.09.001openalex-snapshot
Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.07.006openalex-snapshot
Selling multiple correlated goods: Revenue maximization and menu-size complexity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2015.03.010openalex-snapshot
Bounding the optimal revenue of selling multiple goods
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108691079openalex-snapshot
Auction Theory for Computer Networks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108691079.001openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108691079.002openalex-snapshot
Overview of Modern Computer Networks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108691079.003openalex-snapshot
Mechanism Design and Auction Theory in Computer Networks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108691079.004openalex-snapshot
Open-Cry Auction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108691079.005openalex-snapshot
First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108691079.006openalex-snapshot
Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108691079.007openalex-snapshot
Combinatorial Auction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108691079.008openalex-snapshot
Double-Sided Auction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108691079.009openalex-snapshot
Other Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108691079.010openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auction Using Machine Learning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108691079.011openalex-snapshot
Index
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/wsc63780.2024.10838894openalex-snapshot
Learning Payment-Free Resource Allocation Mechanisms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973730.8openalex-snapshot
An n -to-1 Bidder Reduction for Multi-item Auctions and its Applications
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2492002.2482544openalex-snapshot
The menu-size complexity of auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764498openalex-snapshot
Reverse Mechanism Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2845926.2845928openalex-snapshot
Multi-item auctions defying intuition?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2897518.2897645openalex-snapshot
A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940746openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auctions with Restricted Allocations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940756openalex-snapshot
Mechanism Design for Subadditive Agents via an Ex Ante Relaxation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940789openalex-snapshot
Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2994501.2994506openalex-snapshot
A duality-based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085120openalex-snapshot
Dominant-Strategy versus Bayesian Multi-item Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3055399.3055426openalex-snapshot
The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3055399.3055465openalex-snapshot
Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3188745.3188786openalex-snapshot
Bounding the menu-size of approximately optimal auctions via optimal-transport duality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329616openalex-snapshot
Simple Mechanisms for Profit Maximization in Multi-item Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399454openalex-snapshot
Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538304openalex-snapshot
Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538354openalex-snapshot
Recommender Systems meet Mechanism Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3670865.3673627openalex-snapshot
Settling the Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/ijoc.2022.0275openalex-snapshot
Regret Minimization and Separation in Multi-Bidder Multi-Item Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3982/ecta12618openalex-snapshot
Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4230/lipics.itcs.2021.81openalex-snapshot
How to Sell Information Optimally: An Algorithmic Study
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1404.1341openalex-snapshot
Multi-dimensional Virtual Values and Second-degree Price Discrimination
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1404.2329openalex-snapshot
Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1409.6925openalex-snapshot
A Note on Selling Optimally Two Uniformly Distributed Goods
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1604.05243openalex-snapshot
Better Strategyproof Mechanisms without Payments or Prior --- An Analytic Approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1606.01610openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auctions with Restricted Allocations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1607.03685openalex-snapshot
On Solutions for the Maximum Revenue Multi-item Auction under Dominant-Strategy and Bayesian Implementations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1611.06910openalex-snapshot
Simple Mechanisms for Subadditive Buyers via Duality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1812.01577openalex-snapshot
A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2010.06398openalex-snapshot
ProportionNet: Balancing Fairness and Revenue for Auction Design with Deep Learning
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