On the public citation graph
Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive Valuations
0 signed · 38 inferred · view as graph
Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.
Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the
claims that are yours.
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a
known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped
badge you can embed.
What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36494-3_53openalex-snapshot
The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_17openalex-snapshot
Simple and Efficient Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Monotone Submodular Valuations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59250-3_30openalex-snapshot
Budget Feasible Mechanisms on Matroids
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_1openalex-snapshot
On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_29openalex-snapshot
Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2010.76openalex-snapshot
Frugal and Truthful Auctions for Vertex Covers, Flows and Cuts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2010.77openalex-snapshot
Frugal Mechanism Design via Spectral Techniques
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2014.36openalex-snapshot
Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/sfcs.2005.25openalex-snapshot
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973082.54openalex-snapshot
On the Approximability of Budget Feasible Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/16m1067275openalex-snapshot
Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1250910.1250959openalex-snapshot
Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993615openalex-snapshot
Mechanisms for complement-free procurement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2124295.2124381openalex-snapshot
How to win friends and influence people, truthfully
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2488388.2488489openalex-snapshot
Pricing mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764505openalex-snapshot
Mechanisms for Fair Attribution
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2872427.2883032openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Budget Feasibility with Posted Pricing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3219166.3219229openalex-snapshot
Frugal Auction Design for Set Systems
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4884832openalex-extracted
Maximal Procurement Under a Budget
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_5openalex-snapshot
Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Procurement Auctions with Divisible Agents
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_3openalex-snapshot
Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-03639-1_22openalex-snapshot
Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-18660-7_2openalex-snapshot
Improved Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Submodular Valuations: Beating 4 Deterministically in Linear Time
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2025.104348openalex-snapshot
Efficient and effective budget-feasible mechanisms for submodular valuations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2026.116260openalex-snapshot
Online budget-feasible mechanism design with predictions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/tmc.2022.3162108openalex-snapshot
Hiring a Team From Social Network: Incentive Mechanism Design for Two-Tiered Social Mobile Crowdsourcing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/trustcom63139.2024.00085openalex-snapshot
Budget-Feasible Double Auction Mechanisms for Model Training Services in Federated Learning Market
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/itor.70222openalex-snapshot
Assessing second‐price auctions for parcel exchanges in last‐mile logistics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1137/21m1456364openalex-snapshot
Tight Revenue Gaps among Multiunit Mechanisms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467621openalex-snapshot
Tight Revenue Gaps among Multi-Unit Mechanisms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3543507.3583477openalex-snapshot
Randomized Pricing with Deferred Acceptance for Revenue Maximization with Submodular Objectives
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3723883openalex-snapshot
Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3736252.3742668openalex-snapshot
A Competitive Posted-Price Mechanism for Online Budget-Feasible Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3736252.3742683openalex-snapshot
Equilibrium Efficiency and Learning in Budgeted Procurement Marketplaces
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity
Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers
publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free
and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.